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Introduction
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash-'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.'
Intellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed at the
expense of future creators and of the public at large. Where would we
be if Charles Lindbergh had an exclusive right in the concept of a
heroic solo aviator? If Arthur Conan Doyle had gotten a copyright
in the idea of the detective story, or Albert Einstein had patented the
theory of relativity?... Surely this would have made the world
poorer, not richer, culturally as well as economically.2
The First Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries 'artist' to
have carte blanche when it comes to naming and advertising his
works.3
The right of publicity celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2003.4
Yet, without immediate intervention the doctrine may not survive in
any meaningful form to mark its centennial celebration. Conceived as
a legal protection from the misappropriation or unauthorized
exploitation of one's persona,' the right is quickly being eaten alive by
one of the oldest and most treasured rights in American
jurisprudence: the First Amendment.6 The right of publicity is defined
as the "inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity."7 The conflict that is the focus
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE, act 3, sc. 3.
2. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J. dissenting) (objecting to denial of rehearing en banc).
3. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,463 (6th Cir. 2003).
4. The term "right of publicity" was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in his 1953
opinion Halean Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.).
5. Id at 868.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
7. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed.
2003). McCarthy, one of the leading commentators in the field, also contends that the right
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of this article generally arises when defendants invoke the First
Amendment against a plaintiff who is attempting to exercise his or
her right of publicity.8 This tension has never been addressed by
Congress and has only briefly been discussed by the United States
Supreme Court.9
As of March 2002, twenty-eight states had either passed right of
publicity statutes or carved out a similar form of common law
protection. ° Accordingly, courts at both the state and federal level
have had to grapple with varying statutory definitions of the right
itself, as well as a maze of common law decisions that have left many
commentators clamoring for a federal right of publicity statute to
settle the issue once and for all." However, a federal statute would be
unlikely to answer questions such as: How can a robust right of
publicity coexist with the First Amendment? Can a right created for
the purpose of protecting the commercial rights of celebrities function
along side our societal predilection to protect both artisans and
advertisers?
This article argues that the right of publicity and the First
Amendment can be commingled, but that a new test is needed to help
courts determine how much protection is too much protection. Both
plaintiffs and defendants currently have to wade through conflicting
state and common law tests when engaged in a right of publicity
action where the First Amendment is implicated . Recent decisions at
of publicity is a "distinct legal category" separate but interrelated to the disciplines of
"trademark, copyright, false advertising or right of privacy." Id.
8. This article only examines the right of publicity and the First Amendment in the
context of living plaintiffs. For an examination of the descendibility of the right of
publicity see Peter L. Fletcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of
Publicity: Is there Commercial Life after Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Ralph H.
Laurens, Year of the Living Dead: California Breathes New Life into Celebrity Publicity
Rights, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 109 (2001); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of
Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: Civil Code Sections 990 and 3344, 5
UCLA ENT. L. REv. 167 (1998).
9. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (discussed
infra Part III).
10. MCCARTHY, supra note 7 at § 6:3.
11. See generally Eric Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for Federal
Right of Publicity Statute, DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y (1999) (advocating
the need for a federal right of publicity); Eleanor Johnson, Henley v. Dillard Department
Stores: Don Loves His Henley, and Has a Right to it too, 45 VILL. L. REv. 169 (2000)
(advocating the need for a federal right of publicity); Richard S. Robinson, Preemption,
The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183
(1998) (advocating the need for a federal right of publicity).
12. See Schuyler M. Moore, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The First Amendment vs. The
Right of Publicity for Expressive Works, ENT. L. REP., VOL. 25, No. 6, 4 (2003) (discussing
recent decisions in the field).
both the state13 and federal levels14 only serve to highlight the
confusion and lack of uniformity experienced by all parties involved
in these actions.
This article will examine the right of publicity from the
perspective that the right serves a valuable purpose in our media-
driven society. There are economic, philosophical and moral reasons
that the right of publicity is a positive development within our legal
canon. However, just as with its predecessors copyright and
trademark, the right of publicity must reach an accommodation with
the First Amendment. Beginning with the newsworthy/public interest
exception found in most publicity statutes and common law decisions,
and progressing to a four factor test derived in part from the fair use
exception to the Copyright Act
5 and influenced by trademark's
16
consumer confusion model, this article creates a new test to enable
such an accommodation.
Part II will briefly review the history of the right of publicity,
beginning with its roots in Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren's
article The Right to Privacy.7 It will then discuss the influence of the
Halean Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.'8 decision on Melville
Nimmer's The Right of Publicity'9 and the impact of both on the
modern right of publicity.
Part III will discuss some of the more philosophical
underpinnings of the right from both a legal and moral standpoint,
and explore how these motivations have helped shape the current law
with regards to the First Amendment. Part IV will survey the
newsworthy/public interest exception to the right of publicity, while
Part V will explore the elements of a new four factor test by which
courts may determine if a plaintiff's right of publicity has been
violated. Part VI will summarize the two significant recently created
tests that attempt to resolve the tension between the right of publicity
13. Doe v. Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
14. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437,463 (6th Cir. 2003); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994
(9th Cir. 2001).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2004).
17. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). This article has been referred to as "perhaps the most famous and certainly the
most influential law review article ever written." Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
18. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (discussed infra Part II.B).
19. Nimmer, supra note 17.
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and the First Amendment. Finally, Part VII will discuss the proposed
four factor test and apply it to four recent right of publicity actions
where the First Amendment was a major component of the decision.
I. History
A. The Right to Privacy
The right of publicity has been in tension with the First
Amendment since its forbearer, the right to privacy, was conceived.
Living in a time of pulp fiction and sensationalist yellow journalism,
20
Brandeis and Warren wrote that privacy must be protected from a
press that was "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency., 21 They believed the privacy of individuals
was being sacrificed to "satisfy a prurient taste," as "the details of
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers." 2 This right to privacy for the common man and celebrity
alike was concerned with the "affront to one's human dignity" 3 that
public disclosure of personal information was likely to produce.2
4
Brandeis and Warren's solution was to enable anyone so injured to
recover from the offending party at law.2n
Yet, it was not as much the influence of the Brandeis and Warren
article as it was the Court of Appeals of New York's refusal to
recognize the right of privacy 6 that spurred the New York Legislature
to adopt the nation's first statutory right to privacy in 19 03 .2 Despite
the New York statute often being viewed as the first right of publicity
law in the nation, somewhat ironically (yet consistently) New York
courts have maintained that the statute is not a right of publicity
statute.Y
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 1:13.
21. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 17, at 196.
22. Id.
23. Jeremy T. Maar, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44
B.C. L. REv 863,866 (2003).
24. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 17, at 196.
25. Id. at 213.
26. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 NY 538 (N.Y. 1902). New York's
highest court ruled against the plaintiff's emotional distress claim due to the defendant's
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs picture in an advertisement. Id.
27. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (2004).
28. Perhaps as much as any other factor, the reason that the right of privacy and
publicity continue to be conflated is this stance of New York courts. Despite federal courts
in New York maintaining (until the Court of Appeals of New York spoke definitively on
the matter in 1984) that there was a common law right of publicity separate from the two
20041 C
Nevertheless, the argument made in the Brandeis and Warren
article was so convincing that beginning in 1905 courts across the
country began to recognize the right to privacy at common law. In
the very first decision to recognize the right to privacy, the court was
already keenly aware of the line drawing that would be necessary for
this new right to comport with the First Amendment:
The stumbling block which many have encountered in the way of a
recognition of the existence of a right of privacy has been that the
recognition of such right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty
of speech and of the press. The right to speak and the right of
privacy have been coexistent. Each is a natural right, each exists,
and each must be recognized and enforced with due respect for the
otheri1
B. The Birth of the Right of Publicity
Fifty years after the right to privacy was planted, with the help of
the Second Circuit, it bloomed into the right of publicity. In Halean v.
Topps Chewing Gum,31 the plaintiff, a seller of chewing gum,
contracted with a baseball player for the exclusive use of the player's
photograph in connection with the selling of the plaintiff's product.
32
The defendant, despite knowing of the existing contractual
agreement, induced the same player into a similar contract for the
promotion of the defendant's chewing gum.
33  The defendant
maintained that the plaintiff could rely only upon the right of privacy,
and that the right of privacy was exclusively a personal right and as
such non-assignable. 34 The Second Circuit disagreed, and in so doing
created the right of publicity:35
statutes, the New York courts have "generally refused the many invitations offered them
to recognize an independent right of publicity." Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini:
Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL.
L. REv 836, 858 (1983).
29. Georgia was the first state to recognize a right to privacy: Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins., Co., 122 Ga. 190 (Ga. 1905). Within a few years fourteen others had
done the same: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon and Pennsylvania.
Nimmer, supra note 17, at 203.
30. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 122 Ga. 190,202 (Ga. 1905).
31. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
32. Id. at 867.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Interestingly, a 1960 article written by William Prosser has at times been
misidentified as the source of the evolution of the right of publicity from the right to
privacy. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 409 (2001)
("The common law right of publicity derives from the fourth category of invasion of
privacy identified by Dean Prosser .... ). Prosser's article, which essentially codified the
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We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of
privacy.., a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made
"in gross," i.e_, without an accompanying transfer of a business or
anything else.
Then speaking only for himself and one of his fellow panelists,3 7
Judge Frank wrote:
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them
no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant
which barred any other advertiser from using their picture.
38
The issue was remanded for more fact finding,39 but the wheels
set in motion by Judge Frank continue to turn today. The first and
perhaps still most significant scholarly analysis of Halean was written
one year later by Melville Nimmer.40 Nimmer, who later wrote the
nation's foremost copyright treatise,41 fleshed out Judge Frank's one
paragraph sketch, and defined the new right as the "reverse side of
the coin of privacy." 42
right of privacy into four separate but interconnected torts, was published six years after
Nimmer's article and seven years after the Halean decision. William Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). The four torts were: Unreasonable intrusions upon another's
solitude; Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; Publicly placing another in a false
fight; and the Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or
likeness. Id
36. Halean, 202 F.2d at 868.
37. Chief Judge Swan concurred with the holding but did not seem to endorse Judge
Frank's creation of this new 'right,' only going so far as to concur with the part of the
decision dealing with "defendant's liability for intentionally inducing a ball-player to
breach a contract which gave plaintiff the exclusive privilege of using his picture." Id. at
869.
38. Id. at 868. From the very first, the Second Circuit and the New York Courts have
been at odds interpreting New York's right to privacy statute in regards to the right of
publicity. In Halean, Judge Frank explicitly holds that New York's right to privacy statute
"recognizes" such a right of publicity for prominent persons. Id But see note 28
(describing New York's rejection of a common law right of publicity).
39. Id. at 870.
40. It was appropriately entitled The Right of Publicity. Nimmer, supra note 17.
41. See MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
(Dec. 2003).
42. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 204.
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Nimmer recognized that there had been an explosion in the
means of communication and advertising not only since the Brandeis
and Warren article, but since the right to privacy had become so
commonly part of the legal vernacular.43 The concerns of many
plaintiffs were no longer centered on preserving their privacy, but on
maximizing the monetary value of their public persona." After
outlining what he termed the "inadequac[ies] of traditional legal
theories in protecting publicity values, 4 Nimmer offered some policy
justifications for such a right, arguing that "in most instances a person
achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only after he
has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even money."
46 He
argued that the right of publicity should mimic property rights, and
therefore be assignable. 47
Nimmer posited that the measure of damages should be based
not on the insult to the plaintiff, but on the "value of the publicity
appropriated by the defendant." ' Though an in-depth discussion of
damages for an appropriation of the right of publicity is beyond the
scope of this article, Nimmer's proposal that damages be based not on
mental anguish but on pecuniary loss has been the prevailing view of
scholars.49 Furthermore, such a basis for damages appears to capture
43. Id. at 203-04.
44. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
204 (1954). Nimmer refers to this value as "publicity value." Id.
"Persona" has been defined as "encompass[ing] a use where a viewing audience is
merely reminded of a person even when neither the likeness nor the name of the person is
used." Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 205 (2002), citing Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir.
1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (objecting to denial of rehearing en banc); Rothman uses
the copyright idea/expression dichotomy to argue that persona should be conceived of as
the idea of a person not the expression, in other words, not the individual's name or
likeness. Id at 223; Black's Law Dictionary defines persona as "A person; an individual
human being." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (7th ed. 1999).
45. Nimmer, supra note 44.
46. Id. at 216.
47. Id.
4& Id.
49. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent
Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 854 (1995)
(noting that celebrities have a right for economic damages as a result of the appropriation
without permission of their persona); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs.
the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994)
(advocating a damage analysis sounding in damages after the act of appropriation); Maar,
supra note 23, at 866-67. But see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image.
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 133 (1993) (arguing that
"[p]ublicity rights are about meaning as well as money.").
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Judge Frank's concern when he described the "sorely deprived"
celebrity in Halean. °
II. Justifications
While the right to privacy was first imagined as a method for
protecting citizens from the "outrageous and unjustifiable infliction of
mental distress" by the press of the nineteenth century,51 justifications
for the right of publicity have varied. Economic incentive, moral, and
fairness theories have all been propounded to validate the doctrine.52
One commentator has noted that celebrities generate so much
''economic value" that entire industries have grown up around the
culture of celebrity, and hence need protection.53 For others the right
of publicity is justified by its prevention of unjust enrichment,
otherwise known as "free riding." 4 This concept is often expanded
from the individual to society at large by the "tragedy of the
commons" theory.55 Put another way, it has been argued that the right
of publicity is "needed to ensure that publicity assets are not wasted
by a scramble to use them up as quickly as possible." 56 Others have
argued from a more philosophical standpoint, suggesting that
50. Halean, 202 F.2d at 868.
51. Prosser, supra note 35, at 384.
52 See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834 (1979) (Bird, C.J. dissenting)
(explaining the right by writing: "Often considerable money, time and energy are needed
to develop one's prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be required before
one's skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an
economic return through some medium of commercial promotion."); Tara B. Mulrooney,
A Critical Examination of New York's Right of Publicity Claim, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
1139, 1143-44 (2000) ("The justifications... fall into three main categories: (1) the moral
argument for the recognition of such a right, (2) economic concerns, and (3) public interest
concerns. The moral argument focuses mainly on the failure of privacy laws to adequately
address the plaintiff's harm."); Christopher Pesce, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right
of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 782, 792-93 (1990) ("The right
serves to prevent the unjust enrichment of commercial appropriators, to provide an
incentive to creators, and to protect the public from deception. It creates a kind of
intellectual property that benefits the public by stimulating creative acts.").
53. See Madow, supra note 49, at 129 (detailing some of the variety of ways that
celebrities are vital to the economy: the news stories revolving around celebrities; the
merchandise with celebrity names and/or images on them; celebrity endorsements of
products and services). However, Professor Madow advocates the elimination of the right
of publicity. Id. at 134.
54. Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 U.C.L.A.
ENT. L. REv. 97,109 (1994).
55. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968)
(generally describing the theory).
56. Grady, supra note 54, at 98.
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individuals "ought to have control over how their personas are
presented to others.,
57
In the first and only United States Supreme Court opinion to
address the right of publicity, the Court relied on a mix of
justifications, citing both moral and economic rationales for the right.
In Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co.,8 Hugo Zacchini, a
human cannonball artist, brought a tort action for the "unlawful
appropriation of [his] professional property" against the operator of a
local television station. The defendant broadcast Mr. Zacchini's
entire act on a local news show. 60 The Supreme Court of Ohio
reviewed the case under the right of publicity.6' Though the state's
highest court declared that "one may not use for his own benefit the
name or likeness of another, whether or not the use or benefit is a
commercial one," 62 the Ohio court held on behalf of the news station
because the station had a "privilege to report.., matters of legitimate
public interest. '
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment. 6'
While both courts relied on the First Amendment in reaching their
respective decisions,6 the high court determined that "[w]herever the
line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that
are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent."66
Nonetheless, the court recognized that Zacchini's "state-law right of
publicity would not serve to prevent [Scripps Howard] from reporting
the newsworthy facts about [the] act."67 In other words, while there is
a newsworthy/public interest exception to the right of publicity, the
57. J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (1987) (detailing the "personhood" theory).
58. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
59. Id. at 563-64. The entire act, in which Zacchini is shot out of a cannon into a net,
lasts fifteen seconds. Id. at 563.
60. Id. at 563-64.
61. Id. at 565.
62 Id.
63. Id., quoting Zachinni v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461
(1976).
64. 433 U.S. at 579.
65. Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 574-75. See Samuelson, supra note 28, at 858 n.81 (noting that the resultant
'entire act' standard may be so narrow as to prevent its usefulness in other cases).
67. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574.
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actions of the defendant in this situation went beyond such an
exception.
Justice White, writing for the majority, used a variety of reasons
to justify why the right of publicity is worth protecting. He began by
addressing the economic interest of both the plaintiff and society at
large: the "State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent
and copyright law, focusing on the right of an individual to reap the
reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation." 68 The Court added that such protection
creates "an economic incentive" for the performer to "make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public.., the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts.' '6
The Court also spoke to the free rider rationale, writing: "[n]o
social purpose is served by having the defendant get some free aspect
of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay."7° A Labor Theory justification (sometimes known as a
"natural right to reap what you have sown") crept into the Court's
reasoning as well: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."7 The
Court concluded by recognizing the. right of Ohio (and all the states)
to determine how or if it wishes to protect the economic interests of
entertainers.72
Secondly, the Court addressed the confluence of the right of
publicity and the First Amendment:
There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection. It is also true that entertainment itself can
be important news. But it is important to note that neither the
public nor [broadcaster] will be deprived of the benefit of [an
entertainer's] performance as long as his commercial stake in his
act is appropriately recognized."
68. Id. at 573.
69. Id. at 576, quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
70. Id.
71. Id., quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Nimmer, supra note 17, at
216 (justifying one of the "principle[s] of Anglo-American jurisprudence... that every
person is entitled to the fruit of his labors...."). Another commentator has made the
argument in even starker terms: "Proprietary justice demands that 'he who reaps shall
SOW."' SAMUEL K. MURUMBA, COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF PERSONALITY 72
(1986).
72. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577.
73. Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted).
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The Court's narrow holding has left the door open for a wide
range of interpretations regarding both the rationale for the right of
publicity and how it should interact with the First Amendment.
One of the most complete and detailed interpretations is by
Professor Alice Haemmerli.74 Professor Haemmerli argues that what
is needed is a justification based on the philosophy not of John Locke,
but of Immanuel Kant.75  Haemmerli dissects the standard
justifications for the right of publicity one by one, detailing either how
they encourage conflicting standards of review or offer inadequate
76
reasons for granting the existing protections. By reorienting the
"sweat of the brow" underpinnings that have existed from the
beginnings of the right of publicity, Haemmerli takes a bold step
forward, stating "there is no 'Lockean' notion here of property rights
acquired through labor."' Explaining that Kant believed that "the
modification of a thing by labor 'forms nothing more than an external
sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession,' ' '78 she puts
forward a new model. Advocating a "property right based on human
freedom," 79 she explains that according to Kant:
there is an underlying self; that while there is a difference between
the self and objectification (or commodification) of self, the latter
does not negate the former (indeed, it derives from the former);
that a property right which provides for control over objectification
of identity is not logically opposed to an autonomy right that
protects the self; and that the two can, in fact, be viewed as two
facets of freedom. What this means in reality is that even in the
presence of commodification, a viable claim can be made to control
the commercial exploitation of identity on both moral and
economic grounds.'
However, the most convincing justification for the right of
publicity may be the most obvious: it simply feels as if there should be
one. One hundred years ago, Judge Cobb, in justifying the right to
privacy wrote:
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used.., and
displayed in ... advertisements.., brings not only the person of an
extremely sensitive nature, but even the individual of ordinary
sensibility, to a realization that his liberty has been taken away
from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these
74. Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DUKE L.J. 383 (1999).
75. Id. at 383.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 421.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 429.
80. Id. at 427-28 (emphasis added).
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purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he
is, for the time being under the control of another, that he is no
longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of
freedom, held to service by a merciless master; and if a man of true
instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one can be more
conscious of his complete enthrallment than he is.81
Although Judge Cobb was referring to a violation of an
individual's privacy, no great leap is necessary to read the right of
publicity directly into his reasoning. Our "persona" is "ours." And
while some scholars and practitioners have suggested a federal
publicity statute separate from either trademark or copyright law, 8
and others wish to create a registration system "akin to copyright and
trademark,""3 currently the most important issue facing the right of
publicity is how to balance it with the First Amendment.
The lack of a clearly defined test for analyzing right of publicity
cases where the First Amendment is implicated leaves open the
possibility of widely varying and inconsistent holdings. One jurist has
even expressed concern that the right of publicity is a threat to the
existence of free speech, and objected that the right of publicity
"created an open-ended and ill-defined force which jeopardizes a
right of unquestioned authenticity-free speech."8' One practitioner
has summed up the opposite view by arguing that to "give absolute
protection to expressive works is to eliminate the right of publicity."
8
The current lack of a "principled and consistent method of resolving
the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment"
has resulted in "massive confusion." 6 Recognizing that the right of
publicity is not going away,87 and neither is the First Amendment, a
consistent manner of analyzing the many cases that intersect these
two vital doctrines must be developed. The remainder of this article
attempts to create just such a test.
81. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 122 Ga. 190,220 (1905).
82. See, e.g., Salomon, supra note 57, at 1191-93 (suggesting that while the Copyright
Clause might otherwise be appropriate, as a publicity statute would go beyond 'writings,'
the Copyright Clause might prove limiting and therefore ineffective).
83. Robinson, supra note 11, at 204.
84. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 708 (Ga. 1982) (Welter, J., concurring).
85. Moore, supra note 12, at 5.
86. Kwall, supra note 49, at 47-48.
87. Though some may argue that it should, see Madow, supra note 49.
CAN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AFFORD FREE SPEECH?
III. Step One: The Newsworthy/Public Interest Exception
A. Expression
The First Amendment protects expression. The Restatement of
Unfair Competition refers to the First Amendment's commitment to
freedom of expression;8 a United States Supreme Court Justice has
argued that freedom of speech is individual self-expression; 9 one
observer has discussed the "expressive rights embodied in the First
Amendment;" and a recent Amici brief on behalf of professional
journalists has demanded that the right of publicity be curtailed so as
not to limit the "expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment." 91 With such a consensus, one approach to dealing with
the First Amendment and the right of publicity might be to ask a
single question: Is the work expressive? After all, an expressive test
would seem entirely appropriate if all concerned agreed with the
premise that the central tension is that the "right of publicity's
restriction on the unauthorized commercial use of one's identity
prohibits certain forms of expression... therefore . . . conflict[ing]
with the freedom of speech the First Amendment seeks to protect. '.,92
Thus, if the work is expressive, it is protected by the First
Amendment, otherwise, the plaintiff wins.
However, while the United States Supreme Court has elucidated
a fairly clear line between commercial and noncommercial speech,93
the Court has created no such standard for what constitutes
expressive speech. In fact, it has been argued that Zacchini provides
little guidance when "applied to a case other than the appropriation
of a professional or ... performer's performance." ' It has also been
recently noted that a "three-way split of authority" exists for how to
resolve the tension between the right of publicity and the First
88. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 47 cmt. c. (2003).
89. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,804, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
90. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of
Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 471,479 (2003).
91. Amici Curiae Brief of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and
the Society of Professional Journalists in Support of Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing,
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 00-3584).
92. Maar, supra note 23, at 871.
93. See Part IV.B.
94. F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test
for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against a
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 44 (2003).
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Amendment's interest in protecting expressive works.9 In other
words, courts have been unable to establish exactly what is expressive
and therefore unreachable by the right of publicity.
Before directly exploring the newsworthy/public interest
exception, it is informative to examine two cases with opposite
holdings to demonstrate exactly how difficult it is to define
expressive. Less than a year after Zacchini, Playgirl magazine
published a drawing of a nude black man bearing a striking
resemblance to Muhammad Ali seated in the corner of a boxing ring
with the caption "Mystery Man." Despite the figure not being
named, a verse appears in conjunction with the drawing "which refers
to the figure as 'the Greatest'."'9
While it is unlikely that anyone wishes to be depicted in the nude
without permission, even when such a depiction is a fictitious one
(there is no indication that the drawing was based in reality), such an
artist's rendering at first blush would seem to fit under the ambit of
protection of the First Amendment. After all, it is in a magazine,
albeit one that is not known for art, yet, one covered by the freedom
of the press all the same.
Nevertheless, relying on the pecuniary value of Muhammad Ali's
"public reputation or persona"' and that the "interest underlying the
right of publicity is the 'straightforward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of goodwill" ' 99 the court held Ali had met the
criteria for making out a common law right of publicity claim in New
York. The district court specifically held that the drawing was not
newsworthy, but rather a "dramatization, an illustration falling
somewhere between representational art and cartoon, and is
accompanied by a plainly fictional and allegedly libelous bit of
doggerel."1°° The court's holding and its use of the terms
"dramatization" and "fictional" seem incongruous with another
95. Moore, supra note 12, at 4 (referring to the newsworthy, transformative and
predominant purpose tests, all discussed infra).
96. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
97. Id., "The Greatest" was a moniker that both the plaintiff and the press often used
when referring to Muhammad Ali, the former heavyweight boxing champion of the world.
Id.
98. Id. at 728.
99. Id. at 728-29, quoting Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
576 (1977).
100. Id. at 727. It is unclear what exactly the "verse" the court refers to was, as such it
is hard to draw any specific conclusions from the description of it as "doggerel."
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Southern District Court of New York's decision ten years later in
another right of publicity case.101
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,02 film star Ginger Rogers sought relief
under the right of publicity for the use of her name and public
personality in the film "Ginger and Fred."1m3 The film by
internationally acclaimed director Federico Fellini told the story of
two retired dancers who had "made a living in Italian cabarets
imitating Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, thus earning the nickname
'Ginger and Fred."" ° Throwing up the First Amendment as a shield,
the defendants claimed the plaintiff's charges were precluded by the
First Amendment and that the film's references to Rogers, both in the
title and the film itself, were protected as artistic expression. °m The
court, reviewing other right of publicity cases, stated that "[c]ourts
have been consistently unwilling to recognize the right of publicity
cause of action where the plaintiff's name or picture was used in
connection with a matter of public interest, be it news or
entertainment." '06 Such reasoning being used in the same district as
the court that produced the Ali decision appears inconsistent to say
the least.
In Rogers, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants.' °W Explaining that it is well settled that:
[W]orks of fiction are constitutionally protected in the same
manner as political treatises and topical news stories... What may
be difficult to communicate or understand when factually reported
101. It is interesting to observe that the United States Supreme Court a mere ten years
after Ali held for Hustler Magazine, when it ran an advertisement parody intimating that
the Reverend Jerry Falwell's first sexual experience was a "drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48
(1988). There are of course significant differences between Falwell and Al. The plaintiff in
Falwell brought his action based on libel, slander and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, not the right of publicity and the court's holding was on the basis of the parody
being in the style of a political cartoon. Id.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to argue that Hustler's parody of Falwell was as
damaging if not more so than Playgirl's caricature of Ali. In fact, it is the Court's language
in Falwell that is directly relevant: "The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense,
that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection." Id. at 55 (internal
citations omitted). And, "[iut is firmly settled that... the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers." Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted).
102. 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
103. Id. at 113, 115.
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id. at 121.
106. Id. at 116.
107. Id. at 113.
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may be poignant and powerful if offered in satire, science fiction or
parable .... [Slince Rogers and Astaire are... part of the cultural
history of an era, their fame is an equally apt topic for Fellini's
fictional work.
108
The court concluded that since the plaintiff did not argue the film
lacked a creative component, there must be a creative component and
therefore the "use of [her] name is not primarily for a commercial
purpose. ' ' This conclusion is an excellent example of why an
expressive or creative test would be unworkable. It is hard to imagine
a better way to chill free speech and engender a complete lack of
reliability in judicial holdings than to let judges determine on motions
of law what is or is not expressive or creative. As Justice Holmes
wrote "[it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits."'1 ° Concomitantly, as Ali and Rogers demonstrate, to allow the
entire decision of whether one's right of publicity has been
appropriated to rest on an individual judge's vision of
newsworthiness, is an insufficient means of making such a
determination.
B. Commercial Speech
The above discussion makes clear that a different approach to
right of publicity actions where the First Amendment is implicated is
needed. Yet, a brief investigation into the flip side of expressive
speech, 'commercial speech,' is necessary before going any further.
One commentator has opined that commercial speech is actually just
a term for speech that "looks more like a non-expressive product than
like speech."' .
The United States Supreme Court has defined commercial
speech as speech that "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction."12 Such speech must also generally be "truthful" and
"non-misleading.. 1 . In fact the Supreme Court has created a test to
determine if a law regulating commercial speech is acceptable.
Usually referred to as the Central Hudson 4 test, it holds that only
10& Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 124.
110. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903).
111. Dougherty, supra note 94, at 8.
112. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
113. Lee, supra note 90, at 476.
114. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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commercial speech that is "false, deceptive or misleading.., may be
banned.""' 5 Therefore, speech that has been deemed to be commercial
is still due First Amendment protection,'1 6 just at a lower level of
scrutiny than noncommercial speech.117
However, from its beginnings the right of publicity has been a
right "to control the commercial use of... identity."' 18 Put another
way, it has always been about money, and the exploitation of one's
own persona or identity for the purpose of profit. Hence, right of
publicity cases, almost per se, involve speech that in some form is
commercial. 9 As Judge Frank wrote in Halean, "[wlhether it be
labeled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere,
the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth."' 2 If there were no pecuniary worth
involved, it is highly unlikely that a painter would want to appropriate
Tiger Woods' image.12' Therefore, a simple determination that a use
of celebrity's persona is commercial speech is unlikely to be a
consistent method of deciding right of publicity actions.
As one district court recognized when it granted injunctive relief
for a group of rock star plaintiffs for the use of their likenesses on
buttons, the purpose of the right of publicity is "to protect the
commercial value acquired by names and likenesses due to
investments of time, energy, money, and talent." 22 The same court
held there was a "'proprietary interest' in the commercial value of
one's persona" and as such it was assignable and licensable.
23
115. Id. at 566. The state must show that a "restriction directly and materially
advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest" in order to restrict speech that is not false, deceptive or misleading.
Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994).
116. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1985).
117. Id. at 65.
118. McCarthy, supra note 7, § 1:3 (emphasis added).
119. It is important to note that even a not-for-profit use can still yield speech that has
a pecuniary effect on the celebrity. One might imagine a true story or real image posted for
free on the internet that produces a detrimental result to a celebrity's endorsement ability.
In such an instance the newsworthy/public interest component of the right of publicity
would likely apply. See Part IV.C. The celebrity might well choose to pursue an injunction
nonetheless.
120. Halean v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
121. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). The same could be
said about Bette Midler's voice and Ford (Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988)); or Johnny Carson's name and Here's Johnny Portable Toilets (Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)); and many others.
122. Bi-Rite Ent., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
123. Id.
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It is this issue of the pecuniary value to the plaintiff where one
proponent of the elimination of the right of publicity fails to see that
the right is always commercial. 24 Professor Madow stakes his theory
on the idea that celebrities essentially are a part of the common
language to which individuals within society make a contribution and
therefore we should be able to comment and use this part of our
culture as we each individually see fit.'5 Regardless of the accuracy of
the theory of cultural contribution to celebrity, it leads Madow to
speculate that "[o]nce a celebrity has developed or acquired a
commercially valuable identity, others can use or appropriate it at a
cost that is close to zero."' 6 Yet, Madow neglects to mention that such
use is only at no cost to the public. It is at least possible, if not
probable, that the pecuniary interest held by a celebrity will be
decreased, perhaps eliminated, by a free riding populace unchecked
by any right of publicity.
Assuming that the right of publicity is almost always in some
form commercial, courts are faced with one of two choices when a
defendant raises a First Amendment defense. Either the defendant's
use is protected because it is expressive' 27 and strictly noncommercial
speech is per se unassailable, or courts will proceed to an examination
of the newsworthiness or public interest of the use. In either case,
making a determination that the speech is commercial is not always
necessary, and even when performed, often not decisive in right of
publicity cases.
C. The Exception
A good starting point for the newsworthy/public interest
exception 18 portion of the four factor test is § 47 of the Restatement
124. Madow, supra note 49.
125. Id. at 132-34.
126. Id. at 222, n.445.
127. As far as can be understood from the published opinion, the defendant in Ali
never raised a noncommercial speech First Amendment defense, relying instead on the
newsworthiness of the drawing. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
One author argues that "where it is obvious that the defendant's work is fiction the First
Amendment argument should generally outweigh whatever contextual or moral
objections a plaintiff may raise." Kwall, supra note 49, at 104. Such an argument only
works if one agrees that fiction falls under the public interest and as such should be
protected. Hence, the issue of how to treat fictional works falls under the
newsworthy/public interest section of the herein described test as well.
128. It is vital to note that this is only step one of a multi-faceted test. If the
newsworthy/public interest exception were the only element to be used, it too would fail
for many of the same reasons that an expressive or entire act test would fail.
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of Unfair Competition. Section 47 addresses the right of publicity and
is entitled "Use for Purposes of Trade."' 29 It reads:
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's identity are used
'for purposes of trade' under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used
in advertising the user's goods or services, or are placed on
merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in connection with
services rendered by the user. However, use 'for purposes of trade'
does not ordinarily include the use of a person's identity in news
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.130
Comment "c" to the Restatement states that the "right of
publicity [that] is recognized by statute and common law is
fundamentally constrained by public and constitutional interest in
freedom of expression.' ' 31 This is the newsworthy/public interest
exception. The California right of publicity statute, one of the
broadest in the nation for protecting the rights of plaintiffs, was the
statute chosen by the Restatement to use as a model code. 32 Its
newsworthy/public interest exception states in relevant part: "[f]or
purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not
constitute a use for which consent is required ....","
Beginning with Zacchini, courts have generally cast a wide net
when discussing newsworthiness. "There is no doubt that
entertainment as well as news enjoys First Amendment protection. It
is also true that entertainment itself can be important news."' 4 In
Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc. ," a district court held
that the publication of nude pictures of the plaintiff captured from a
film in which she willingly performed in the nude were newsworthy.'
6
The court held that "the scope of what constitutes a newsworthy
event has been afforded a broad definition and held to include even
129. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (2003).
130. Id.
131. Id. at § 47 cmt. c.
132. Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 TORTS
& INS. L.J. 635, 637 (1995) ("The Restatement, in stating a black-letter rule protecting the
celebrity's 'identity,'... and in other provisions, has opted almost completely for the
California Approach in preference to New York's.").
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (2003).
134. Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
135. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
136. Id. at 405.
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matters of entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting
phases of human activity in general." '137
Another example of a court invoking the newsworthy exception
was in Stephano v. News Group. '3 In Stephano, the plaintiff, a fashion
model, brought an action against the publisher of New York
Magazine on grounds that his right of publicity had been violated.139
The defendant had used the same picture of the plaintiff in two
separate issues of the magazine.'9 The second use was for an article
titled "Best Bets" for the year in fashion.141 The plaintiff claimed that
he had only agreed to, and been compensated for, one use of the
picture. 42 Accordingly, he alleged the defendant had (in the language
of the statute) used "his photograph for trade or advertising purposes
without his consent.' ' 143 The Appellate Division'44 rejected the
defendant's affirmative defense of "newsworthiness,' ' 145 finding that it
was "possible that this article constituted an advertisement in disguise
since many of the Magazine's advertisers were mentioned in the
copy," and remanded for further factual examination.4
The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, and held that the
article fell under the rubric of public interest.14 ' The Court explained
that "a picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
138. 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984). The Stephano decision is a landmark one in New
York right of publicity law, as it is the holding where the court rejected the Second
Circuit's reasoning that a common law right of publicity separate from the statutory right
of privacy existed in New York. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 6:78.
Reading a broadness into the language of the statute unlike its predecessors, the
Court of Appeals of New York held that the New York right of privacy "statute applies to
any use of a person's picture or portrait for advertising or trade purposes whenever the
defendant has not obtained the person's written consent to do so." 64 N.Y.2d at 183
(emphasis added). Therefore, the statute applies to an instance where a plaintiff
"generally seeks publicity" but "has not given written consent for a particular use." Id.
Hence, the court opened the door to right of publicity actions under the rubric of the right
to privacy statute. Yet, by so doing, the court closed the door on plaintiffs bringing such an
action outside of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51, and required that such actions be
brought under the statute. Id. This action eliminated a thirty-year history of a distinct and
progressive common law right of publicity in New York.
139. Id. at 180.
140. Id. at 179.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 180.
143. Id.
144. Stephano v. News Group Pub., Inc. 98 A.D. 2d 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
145. "A collateral question is presented as to whether the article's newsworthiness was
merely incidental to the commercial purpose of the article." Id. at 292.
146. Id. at 291.
147. Stephano v. News Group Pub., Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 184-85 (N.Y. 1984).
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not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within
the prohibition of the statute unless it has no real relationship to the
article, or unless the article is an advertisement in 
disguise."' 1
Holding that "[tihe newsworthiness exception applies not only to
reports of political happenings and social trends but also to news
stories and articles of consumer interest including developments in
the fashion world,"1 49 the court found the article was not an
advertisement in disguise because fashion trends can fit within a
liberally applied newsworthiness exception.
The Court of Appeals' emphasis on a "liberal" application of the
newsworthy/public interest exception tips the scale in favor of
defendants in right of publicity actions. The Supreme Court of New
York's decision in Welch v. Group W. Productions'50 demonstrates the
breadth of the Stephano holding. The court rejected a plaintiff's right
of publicity claim that his image had been used in an unauthorized
fashion in an award show for commercials.'51 The court wrote: "It has
been held that these terms (the language of the New York statute)
should not be construed to include newsworthy events or matters of
interest, which include not only political happenings and social events
but also articles of interest to consumer groups and fashion 
events.' 152
Then, expanding on what content falls into the newsworthy
category, "[n]ot only the existence of an article of commerce, but its
availability at a particular place, and even its price, may be considered
newsworthy to special groups."'53 Concluding with a clear refutation
of the plaintiff's argument that the only reason his picture was being
used was to make money (hence falling outside the scope of the
exception), the court held that a desire to profit does not
automatically remove an activity's newsworthiness: "That the
television segment was motivated by the desire of the defendants to
increase their profits does not convert a newsworthy article or
148. Id. at 185.
149. Id. at 184.
150. 138 Misc. 2d 856,858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
151. It Plaintiff had appeared in a commercial which was awarded an award. Plaintiff
claimed his picture was being used without his written consent for the purposes of
advertising or trade by the company which produced the award show. Id. at 858.
152 Id at 860.
153. Id The court's broad language seems to presage the California Supreme Court:
"Newsworthiness is not limited to 'news' in the narrow sense of reports of current events.
It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public
for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably
be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published." Shulman v. Group W.
Prod., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 225 (Cal. 1998).
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television show into a trade purpose, since it is the content of the
material which determines whether it is newsworthy."154
Fortunately for celebrities the holdings of the New York courts
have not entirely occupied the field. A 1983 California Court of
Appeals encountered a defendant improperly invoking the
newsworthy exception. In Eastwood v. Superior Court"5 the film star
sued the National Enquirer for what he labeled a false article. 56
Eastwood was victorious on all counts as the court held "that
Eastwood has sufficiently alleged that the Enquirer has commercially
exploited his name, photograph, and likeness under both the common
law and § 3344(a)." 157 Grounding its holding in § 3344(d)," 8 the court
ruled there was no statutory newsworthy exception for a story that
was false and presented as true.1 9 Deciding that the "deliberate
fictionalization of Eastwood's personality constitutes commercial
exploitation, and becomes actionable when it is presented to the
reader as if true with the requisite scienter,"1 ° the court held for the
plaintiff. The court did not speak to the consequences if the
defendant had not had the required level of scienter, yet still
published a false or misleading story. One would imagine under
Central Hudson16 1 such a story might still be actionable.
In Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,1 62 the Ninth Circuit reversed
a trial court holding for the defendants and remanded for trial.' 63
Defendant, a popular clothing outfitter, used a picture of the plaintiffs
surfing in a competition in 1965 in Hawaii in its Spring Quarterly
subscription catalog, which is the defendant's "largest advertising
vehicle."' 64 The theme of the catalog was "Spring Fever" and featured
a section entitled "Surf Nekkid" which included a 700-word story
154. 138 Misc. 2d 856, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (emphasis added).
155. Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 420 (1983).
156. Id. at 421.
157. Id. at 421. § 3344 is California's right of publicity statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344
(2003).
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (2003) (California's newsworthy/public interest
exception).
159. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 413.
160. Id. at 426.
161. 447 U.S. 557 (1986).
162. 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
163. Id. at 999.
164. Id. at 999-1000.
about the history of surfing at a particular beach in California. The
picture of the plaintiffs appeared on the following page. 165
Using the surf theme, the defendants manufactured and
advertised T-shirts in the Spring Quarterly that looked exactly like
the shirts worn by the plaintiffs in the pictures. 66 The court, while
recognizing the existence of a broad newsworthy exception, firmly
laid out limits to the defense: "the defense is not absolute; we must
find a proper accommodation between the competing concerns of
freedom of speech and the right of publicity. ' 67
The Ninth Circuit compared Downing with an earlier surfing-
right of publicity case decided in state court in California, Dora v.
Frontline Video.' 6 In Dora the plaintiff sought damages for the
"unauthorized use of his name, voice, and likeness."'6 The plaintiff,
Mickey Dora, was known as a local surfing legend in the 1950s. The
defendant found video footage of the plaintiff surfing and included it
in a video documentary chronicling the beginnings of surfing at
Malibu. 70 Citing the newsworthy/public interest exception in its
holding for the defendant, the California Court of Appeals concluded
that:
Though both celebrities and noncelebrities have the right to be free
from the unauthorized exploitation of their names and likenesses,
every publication of someone's name or likeness does not give rise
to an appropriation action. Publication of matters in the public
interest, which rests on the right of the public to know and the
freedom of the press to tell it, is not ordinarily actionable.'
7
1
The Downing panel contrasted Mickey Dora's contribution to
the development of the sport of surfing, which was the "point of the
program" in Dora, to the plaintiffs being used as "essentially window
dressing to advance the catalog's surf theme" in Downing.'72
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Abercrombie & Fitch's use
165. Id at 1000 (It should be reiterated that the picture of the plaintiffs was not taken
in California, but in Hawaii).
166. Id. The pages directly following the pictures of the plaintiffs advertised the shirts.
Id.
167. Id. at 1001 (internal quotations omitted).
168. 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993).
169. Id. at 540.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 542. The court held the documentary "contains matters of public interest
and that the respondent was not required to obtain appellant's consent to use his name,
likeness, and voice in the program."
172. 265 F.3d at 1002.
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was not entitled to First Amendment protection as it was more
113commercial than newsworthy or in the public interest.
The newsworthy/public interest exception cases analyzed above
seem to follow a relatively predictable pattern: any use that may be of
1417517interest even to a small select group,"' or is true, or is creative,176
without being entirely exploitative 77 will be held to be newsworthy or
in the public interest. 178 The final two cases to be surveyed in this
section present almost identical fact patterns yet yield opposite
results. It is just such an outcome that the four factor test is designed
to avoid.
In Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,17' Esquire magazine republished a
photograph of film star Cary Grant in 1971 that it had previously
published in 1946.'80 Grant's picture was one of six that the defendant
altered, using the celebrity's heads but substituting a model's body for
everything below the neck to make it appear as if the celebrities were
wearing clothes from 1971.181 The brand name and price of the
sweater worn by "Grant" in the 1971 picture was listed beneath the
photograph) 2 Grant brought a right of publicity complaint under
New York's common law, which Esquire claimed was barred by the
First Amendment. '3 The court analyzed both the statutory and
common law claims simultaneously and found that while "as a matter
of law the article on its face does not constitute an advertisement,"
Grant's face was being used for the "purposes of trade."18,
Not having the luxury of the Zacchini decision, the court
reviewed New York decisions on the right of publicity where the First
Amendment was implicated and observed that the trend skewed
173. 265 F. 3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001).
174. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984); Welch v.
Group W. Prods., 138 Misc. 2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
175. Dora v. Frontline Video, 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993); Ann Margret v. High
Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
176. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
177. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
17& Ali would appear as an outlier to this rule which is why it was included, to
demonstrate the inconsistent body of common law that has developed with regards to the
question at hand. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
179. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
180. Id. at 877.
181. Id. at 878.
182 Id.
183. Id. The plaintiff also brought a libel complaint which was summarily dismissed
and a right of privacy action under the New York Civil Rights Law § 51. Id.
184. Id. at 879.
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towards defendants in these types of actions.8" Nonetheless, the court
compares the plaintiff's situation with that of a celebrity that pursues
the limelight and exploits her image successfully.86 The court reasons
that a picture taken of such a celebrity while she is out on the town
and then published would be a use of which she could not complain.
However, "it by no means follows that publishers could present [her]
apparently posed.., and without her consent use [such a picture] in
competition with other pictures for which she had professionally
posed ... ,187
The court reasons: "[a] fortiori, no magazine could without her
consent crop her head off a posed photograph and superimpose it on
the torso of another model."'1 8 The court concludes that Cary Grant
should not be thought of any differently because he has not pursued
the exploitation of his image. "If the owner of Blackacre decides for
reasons of his own not to use his land but to keep it in reserve he is
not precluded from prosecuting trespassers.'89 Simply put, the court
held the defendant exploited the plaintiff's image "merely to attract
attention."' 90
The district court, addressing the possibility that a holding for
Grant would be barred by the First Amendment stated:
One must never lose sight of the purpose behind the decisions
implementing the First Amendment. The Supreme Court does not
closely scrutinize restraints on obscenity because it feels that
obscene literature is any boon to mankind. On the contrary, it
scrutinizes such restraints solely because it feels that the concept of
obscenity is so vague that unless rigorously circumscribed the fear
of obscenity prosecution might inhibit the free expression of artistic
talent.'9'
Furthermore, the court speaking to future publishers, writes that
if a publisher "feels impelled to trade upon the name and reputation
of a celebrity, it must pay the going rate for such benefit."' 92 The court
finishes by noting that a painter could not go out and steal the
185. 367 F.Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court cites five cases all but one of
which "denied recovery under § 51, for the reason that in each the court held the plaintiff's
picture to have been 'reasonably related' to a newsworthy subject and thus its use not to
have been 'for purposes of trade' within the meaning of § 51." Id.
186. Id. at 880. The court uses Leslie Hornby, also known as "Twiggy" for its example.
187. Id. (punctuation omitted)
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 881.
191. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F.Supp. 876, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
192. Id. at 883.
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materials it needs for its work, and neither can a publisher.1 9 The
court's opinion appears well reasoned, logical and an appropriate
application of the newsworthy/public interest exception test.
Nevertheless, thirty years after the publication of Grant's picture,
another magazine did almost the exact same thing.
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc.'94 Los Angeles Magazine
ran a series of pictures of famous film stars entitled "Grand Illusions"
which via computer alteration made it look like the film stars were
wearing "Spring 1997" fashions.1'9 One of the sixteen altered photos
was of Dustin Hoffman from the film "Tootsie," in which he plays a
cross-dressing man. 196 The altereq picture was a still photo where
Hoffman's body had been changed for that of a male model wearing a
different dress than the one worn in the film. 97 The defendant did not
receive permission for such an alteration from either Hoffman or the
copyright holder of the film and Hoffman brought a right of publicity
action arguing his name and likeness had been appropriated.19 Not
surprisingly, the defendant argued the picture was part of "an
expression of editorial opinion, entitled" to First Amendment
protection.199
Hoffman argued that because the photograph identified the
names of the designers of the clothes the model was wearing, the
speech was purely commercial." The Ninth Circuit was not
convinced. "Viewed in context, the article as a whole is a combination
of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial
comment on classic films and famous actors. Any commercial aspects
are inextricably entwined with expressive elements, and so they
cannot be separated out from the fully protected whole."' ' The
district court, much as the Grant court did, reasoned that the only
193. Id. "[N]obody would seriously contend that artistic need would authorize a
painter to walk into a supply store and help himself to whatever he might require." Id.
194. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (Capital Cities was Los Angeles Magazine's parent
company).
195. Id. at 1182-83. Interestingly one of the actors used in the piece was Cary Grant
from the movie "North by Northwest." Id. at 1183. It does not appear that Mr. Grant's
estate brought an action against the defendant.
196. Id. at 1182-83.
197. Id. The new caption read: "Dustin Hoffman isn't a drag in a butter-colored silk
gown by Richard Tyler and Ralph Lauren heels." Id. at 1183.
198. Id. at 1183.
199. Id. at 1184. It is of note that the district court held for Hoffman under the theory
that the photograph was false speech and therefore not protectable. Id.
200. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001)
201. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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purpose for Hoffman's image to be used was to "attract attention" to
the magazine.2 The appeals court reversed the decision, using an
unorthodox line of reasoning.
The panel held that a "printed article meant to draw attention to
the for-profit magazine in which it appears, however, does not fall
outside of the protection of the First Amendment because it may help
to sell copies." 23 Though in and of itself this is not an unusual
argument, the court follows by finding that not only was the speech
protected it was "not commercial speech." 2 4 While the court
acknowledges that there was testimony that the "issue and the use of
celebrities was intended in part to 'rev up' the magazine's profile, that
does not make the fashion article a purely 'commercial' form of
expression. '
Though it would not be hard to see the creative elements needed
to produce the article, that the court leapt from the speech not being
"purely commercial" to it being essentially expressive, and therefore
exempt from review is a tough argument to reconcile. As one
commentator observed, the court "spent surprisingly little time
discussing how it should evaluate the magazine's conduct."" Between
the use of the designer's names, a buyer's guide in the back of the
magazine listing the prices and stores where one could find the items
worn by the plaintiff,n and the testimony that the point of the article
was to rev up the profile of the publication, it is hard to agree that the
article had no commercial components to it. In finding for the
defendant without invoking the newsworthy/public interest exception
the court makes its holding one on which it is difficult to rely." One
sure sign of this unreliability is that one practitioner in summarizing
the case has essentially been forced to guess at the court's reasoning
for its decision, writing: "[a]although the court did not state the basis
for First Amendment protection, the only logical basis was that the
photograph qualified as an expressive work."2
202. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
("Moreover, the use of Mr. Hoffman's name and likeness was wholly unnecessary to
deliver whatever message Defendant, Los Angeles Magazine, Inc., claims the Los Angeles
Magazine article contained").
203. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 253 F.3d at 1186.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Lee, supra note 90, at 495.
207. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 253 F.3d at 1185.
208. Perhaps most surprising was that neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit
cited Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F.Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
209. Moore, supra note 12, at 4.
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It is an inconsistent holding like Hoffman that led to the
development of the four factor test. It is clear that when a court
applies the exception with an eye towards the type of uses in
Eastwood or Downing, the exception will fail. However, it is holdings
like Hoffman or Stephano, where a court could reasonably find that
there was a newsworthy exception, but a plaintiff's right to publicity
was nevertheless being misappropriated, that the below test is
intended to address. These types of holdings are the reason why the
newsworthy/public interest exception is only the starting place for
determining the outcome of right of publicity cases implicating the
First Amendment, and not the finish line.
IV. The Four Factor Test
A. Overview
Each factor of the following test is designed to be utilized only
after a holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's name,
persona or likeness, is newsworthy or in the public interest.210 The
four factors are: Does the use evoke the image or persona of the
plaintiff? Is the use related to the plaintiff's public persona? Is the use
an advertisement in disguise? Are alternate means of conveying the
defendant's message available? An answer of "no" to any of the four
factors should result in an automatic holding for the defendant.211
While no single element carries more weight than any other, each
should be examined in the order presented. If all questions are
answered in the positive, the plaintiff's right of publicity is a strong
one, despite the First Amendment test of newsworthiness. Though it
may appear harsh for a defendant to succeed with a single 'no,' while
the plaintiff will only have the opportunity to succeed after securing
four positive answers, this is for good reason. The right of publicity is
inherently one that rewards the few over the many. For a plaintiff to
successfully stop dissemination of an "idea" or "art," the standard
should be high.
210. If a defendant were to invoke a First Amendment newsworthiness defense and
fail to convince a court of the public interest of the use, it would be difficult for the
defendant to win his or her case.
211. For example in addressing the first element, if a use was found not to evoke the
image or persona of the plaintiff, clearly his or her right of publicity is not being violated.
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B. Does the Use Evoke the Image or Persona of the Plaintiff?.
While the question of whether a plaintiff's persona or image has
been evoked in the use in question may at first appear to be a simple
one, at times it has been the crux of the issue in a right of publicity
action. The most infamous such action is White v. Samsung.1 2 In
White, the plaintiff, famous for her role as the hostess of the television
game show "Wheel of Fortune," claimed the defendant had
appropriated, without her consent, her identity by imitating her with a
robot in a commercial. 213 The defendant on the other hand claimed
two separate First Amendment defenses.214 First, that the ad was a
parody and, in the alternative, that the ad was based on a "'generic'
game show hostess and not on Vanna White.
21 5
The Ninth Circuit was not swayed by either defense. The court
held the use involved a "true advertisement run for the purpose of
selling Samsung VCRs... [and] [t]he ad's spoof of Van White... is
subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary
message., 216 As to the second argument the court wrote: "for celebrity
exploitation advertising to be effective, the advertisement must evoke
the celebrity's identity. The more effective the evocation, the better
the advertisement., 217 The court explained that it could enforce a right
of publicity where neither the plaintiff's name, photograph, likeness
or voice had been 'used:' because since "Prosser's early formulation,
the case law has borne out his insight that the right of publicity is not
limited to appropriation of name or likeness.,
218
The Ninth Circuit's holding and subsequent decision to deny an
en banc rehearing evoked a "vigorous,',211 "stinging dissent." ° With
what can only be described as incredulity, Judge Alex Kozinski
assesses the results of White:
Under the majority's opinion, it's now a tort for advertisers to
remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name,
voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a
product; but simply to evoke the celebrity's image in the public's
mind. This Orwellian notion withdraws far more from the public
212. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
213. Id. at 1396-97.




218. White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
219. Marr. supra note 23, at 882.
220. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B]
(1994).
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domain than prudence and common sense allow. It conflicts with
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause. It raises serious First
Amendment problems...221
This decision has led one commentator to note that as the
"actual name or likeness of the person need not be used, right of
publicity holders can monopolize abstractions and reminders about
themselves and the characters that they play. Ultimately, the use of
"persona" allows people to protect the idea of themselves rather than
the concrete expression of their name and likeness."m  There is no
question that in many cases, reminding the public of the celebrity is
the entire intent of the advertisement to begin with. The holding in
White delivers a strong weapon into the hands of celebrity plaintiffs
when encountering advertisers. Yet, Judge Kozinski argues that it
goes beyond advertisers, threatening the First Amendment itself:
"[t]he intellectual property right created by the panel.., has no fair
use exception; no right to parody; no idea-expression dichotomy. It
impoverishes the public domain, to the detriment of future creators
and the public at large." m Questioning the majority's entire First
Amendment rationale, he writes that the "First Amendment isn't just
about religion or politics-it's also about protecting the free
development of our national culture." 24
In White, the majority cites a case that does not touch specifically
on the First Amendment but is an excellent example of whether the
image of the plaintiff being evoked is used as a threshold question. In
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,m the defendant used
an altered photograph of the plaintiff's racing car for a cigarette
advertisement. 226 The alterations made to the car did not remove
some of the telltale signs that it was the plaintiff's vehicle, and
"[s]everal of the plaintiff's affiants who saw the commercial on
television had immediately recognized plaintiff's car and had inferred
that it was sponsored by Winston cigarettes." m Hence, there was little
221. White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(objecting to denial of rehearing en banc).
222. Rothman, supra note 44, at 222-23. Rothman argues that this protection of the
"idea of oneself" is in direct opposition to Copyright law. Id.
223. White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d at 1516.
224. It at 1519. Kozinski also chastises the majority for holding that because
Samsung's speech was commercial it was due no protection, writing that "less protection
means protected nonetheless." Id. at 1519-20.
225. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
226. Id. at 822. That the plaintiff was driving the vehicle was determined via the
pleadings as his "facial features" are not visible in the picture. Id.
227. Id. Another example of evocativeness being a key issue is Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) where the plaintiff won
CAN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AFFORD FREE SPEECH?
question that the plaintiff persona was being evoked by the
advertisement.
The test recommended here is not the stringent standard of
White, but rather the rational factual exploration undertaken in
Motschenbacher. It appears clear that under the White holding it
would be difficult not to evoke the image of a given celebrity. Yet, as
previously stated, advertisers and artists will generally choose a
method of representation to at least produce some passing evocation
of the celebrity in question. Hence, Motschenbacher is a good middle
ground. First, the plaintiff was in the car. Second, despite altering the
car, plaintiff's fans believed he was in the car. It should be clear that
evoking the plaintiff is a low standard to meet, but it is an important
one nonetheless.
C. Is the Use Related to the Plaintiff's Public Persona?
The Copyright Act of 1976 28 contains a fair use exception.
Codified as a four part test, 29 the purpose is to provide a "privilege to
use copyright material in a way that otherwise would be a violation of
the copyright monopoly." 23 Commentators and courts alike have
struggled with the application of the copyright fair use factors to the
right of publicity. One authority has stated that to use the "copyright
fair use framework in cases presenting a conflict between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity is inappropriate. '23 Another
notes that the "fair use doctrine, nevertheless, is the most clearly
articulated approach to reconciling property and speech interests in
the intellectual property field. '' 232 Yet, the same author also observes
that this "does not mean [using fair use factors] is popular or [that
their] application is predictable. '233
injunctive relief for the use of his name to evoke his persona on behalf of a portable toilet
company with which the plaintiff had no affiliation.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
229. The four factors making up the copyright "fair use" test are: 1. the purpose and
character of the use; 2. the nature of the copyrighted work; 3. the amount and
substantiality of the portion used; 4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
230. Douglas J. Ellis, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: A Comment on
Why Celebrity Parodies are Fair Game for Fair Use, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 575, 599 (1996).
231. Kwall, supra note 49, at 58. Professor Kwall "confesses" that she has previously
written that the copyright fair use factors were the "appropriate means" to balance the
competing interests, but has since reconsidered. Id. at 58 n.54.
232. Lee, supra note 90, at 481-82.
233. Id. at 482.
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Nevertheless, one influential court has appropriated a portion of
the doctrine to craft its own test for examining the right of publicity
and the First Amendment. In Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup,
Inc. TM the California Supreme Court created a balancing test for
determining whether a use of a celebrity's persona is new and
somehow different and hence transformative, and therefore
protected. In creating its test, the court rejected "a wholesale
importation of the fair use doctrine, ' 25 and selected only the
"purpose and character of the use"' ' factor as being "particularly
pertinent to the task of reconciling the rights of free expression and
publicity.'237
Part two of the four factor test borrows from the Comedy III
court's reasoning and asks: is the use in question related to the
plaintiff's public persona? Put another way, what is the purpose of the
use of the plaintiff's persona? The need for this portion of the test is
demonstrated in the varied holdings of the following cases.
In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.28 the California
Court of Appeals held for a newspaper in its use of Joe Montana's
image in a poster. Montana, the famed quarterback for the San
Francisco Forty Niners, claimed his right of publicity was violated by
the defendant's sale of an artist's rendering of Montana celebrating
his victory in Super Bowl XXIII, in poster form.239 The court reasoned
that "[B]ecause Montana's name and likeness appeared in the posters
for precisely the same reason they appeared on the original
newspaper front pages [i.e.,] because Montana was a major player in
contemporaneous newsworthy sports events .... [his] claim that [the
defendant] used his face and name solely to extract the commercial
value from them fails." 24°
It is exactly this type of fact pattern that brings Professor Madow
to question the need for a right of publicity. Posing a hypothetical
question regarding the incentive argument, he asks: "will
Quarterback Brown give up professional football and his multimillion
234. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001). The Comedy III
decision and the court's transformative test are discussed in Part VI.
235. Id. at 404.
236. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2004).
237. 25 Cal. 4th at 404.
238. 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995).
239. Id. at 792-93. The rendering had been on the front page of the newspaper the day
after the game. Montana conceded that such use was newsworthy. His complaint was
based on the reproduction for resale in poster form. Id. at 794.
240. Id. (emphasis in original).
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dollar salary if others are free to use his picture on posters or T-shirts
without paying him for the privilege?" 24' Yet such an argument misses
the point entirely. In Montana, the court held that because the
original use of the rendering was newsworthy, the subsequent
commercial use was also newsworthy. 242 This holding allowed the
court to skirt the incentive argument completely.
In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. ,243 a comedian's attempt to
enjoin a poster marketer from selling posters of him with the phrase
"For President" on it failed on First Amendment grounds. The trial
court held that Paulsen had no right of publicity claim because he had
conducted a "mock campaign for the presidency" and therefore a
poster "which portrays [the] plaintiff in that role... is a form of
public interest presentation to which protection must be extended."
2 4
The Paulsen holding was grounded in the plaintiff having thrust
himself into the:
[N]ational political scene, a sphere which is itself always
"newsworthy" and which propels into such category all, irrespective
of prior status, who aspire to participate therein. It is, moreover, an
arena whose participants have traditionally been the fairest of all
game for unbridled, unrestrained public comment and criticism
ranging from the ridiculous to the scurrilous. Limitations upon the
permissible in political expression are almost nonexistent. It is the
strength of our political system that it can survive and flourish in
such matrix, where the sensibilities of the participants must bow to
the superior public interest in completely unfettered and




The holding was based on the speech being political. Obviously,
no such claim was relevant to Joe Montana's action.
A pair of New York cases decided after Zacchini should have
helped the Montana court: Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.
2
4
and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.247 Both found the
representatives of Elvis Presley's estate arguing that memorabilia
with "The King" on it was a misappropriation of his right of publicity.
The estate won both times. In the former, the court rejected a
newsworthy defense by the poster's maker, holding: "there is no
constitutional protection for selling posters of Elvis Presley as Elvis
241. Madow, supra note 49, at 210. Madow answers his own question, "not likely." Id.
242. Montana, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 794.
243. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
244. Id. at 506, 507.
245. Id. at 507.
246. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
247. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Presley."m The latter decision found that a poster with the phrase "In
Memory 1935-1977" did not make the use newsworthy.249 This
decision has led one commentator to question why the "Joe Montana
poster was Joe Montana as Joe Montana, yet found to be
newsworthy. This ability to manipulate outcomes by conclusory
categorizations is inadequate to protect freedom of speech."
'
It is exactly this lack of consistency that begs for clarification.
Hence, the issue should be a simple one: is the use related to the
public persona of the plaintiff? In all of the above cases, the answer is
simple: yes. In such cases a court would now proceed to the third
factor, the advertising in disguise question. However, an example of
when the use is not that of the public persona is also worth examining.
In Wendt v. Host Int'l,2l the plaintiffs, George Wendt and John
Ratzenberger appealed a dismissal of their right of publicity claim to
the Ninth Circuit. The defendants, via license had created
"animatronic robotic figures" based on the characters played by the
plaintiffs in the television show: "Cheers. ',212 The defendants placed
the robots in airport bars "modeled after the set" 23 of the show. The
plaintiffs did "concede that they retain no rights to the characters
Norm and Cliff... [yet argued it was] the physical likeness to [the
plaintiffs], not Paramount's characters, that has commercial value to
[the defendant]."
The district court held for the defendants, asserting that "no
reasonable jury could find that the robots are similar in any manner
whatsoever to Plaintiffs. ''ns Yet, the Ninth Circuit "conclude[d] from
[its] own inspection of the robots that material facts exist that might
cause a reasonable jury to find them sufficiently 'like' the
248. 444 F. Supp. at 285.
249. 579 F.2d at 222.
250. Dougherty, supra note 94, at 15.
251. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
252- Id at 809. Mr. Wendt played "Norm" and Mr. Ratzenberger played "Cliff." Id. at
813.
253. Id
-254. Id. at 811. To the great disdain of commentators, the court held that the
"[a]ppellants' claims are not preempted by federal copyright law." Id. at 810. See Michael
J. Albano, Nothing to Cheer About. A Call for Reform of the Right of Publicity in
Audiovisual Characters, 90 GEo. L.J. 253 (2001) ("The Ninth Circuit has continued to test
the limits of the right of publicity, but its reasoning in this decision [Wendt] oversteps the
bounds of logic."); Johnson, supra note 11, at 186 (analyzing the Wendt decision,
concluding: "Few circuit courts other than the Ninth Circuit have recognized such an
expansive right of publicity. It is unlikely that animatronics reproduction claims would
have much success in any other circuit.").
255. Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F.3d at 810 (internal quotations omitted).
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appellants . . . . "2 Regarding this article's four factor test, it is
important to make two points at this juncture. First, the plaintiffs in
Wendt were in danger of failing the first test: is the use evocative?
This is clearly a tougher question when the issue is the portrayal of
fictional characters by real people. Yet it is an even tougher question
when the facts indicate that the question is: Does a portrayal of
fictional characters played by real people by robots violate a right of
publicity? Obviously, the Ninth Circuit believes the answer is yes,
based on its holdings in both White and Wendt.
In response to the difficulty of such a situation, when the
evocative question is one that cannot be easily answered, the next
element concerns the type of use at hand: is the use related to the
plaintiff's public persona? The obvious point that must be made is
that no one would want a robot of George Wendt portraying George
Wendt. The commercial exploitation by Host is of a fictional character
that George Wendt portrayed. The Ninth Circuit cites the California
Supreme Court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, explaining "an actor
or actress does not lose the right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a fictional
character."' 57 Yet, there were serious questions in Wendt as to
whether either plaintiff's likeness was actually being exploited. The
district court held there was "no similarity at all" between the
plaintiffs and the robots.2 8
The answer to the second factor as applied to Wendt should have
been: no. The robots were placed in a bar setting by Host
International, not by coincidence, but because the robots were
representative of the copyrighted characters, owned by Paramount
Pictures and licensed to Host International. "Norm" and "Cliff" were
characters from a show set in a bar, and the characters, particularly
Norm, were in large part famous for sitting on bar stools. 59
Dissenting, Judge Kozinski wrote: "[w]hen portraying a character
who was portrayed by an actor, it is impossible to recreate the
character without evoking the image of the actor in the minds of
256. Id.
257. Id at 811 (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 823 (1979)). Lugosi
saw the heirs of the late Bela Lugosi bring a right of publicity action against Universal for
exploiting Lugosi's portrayal of Dracula. Id
258 Id. at 812. In fact, after the defendant failed to receive permission from the
plaintiffs as to the use of their likenesses, the robots were "altered cosmetically" and
renamed "Hank and Bob." Id. at 813.
259. Wendt v. Host Int'l, 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(objecting to denial of rehearing en banc).
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viewers." 260 Assailing the ruling as contrary to the law of copyright, he
continued: "[a]t the very least, Paramount must be able to reproduce
the characteristics that bring Norm and Cliff to mind."6' Finding it
difficult to imagine an instance where a celebrity would not win this
type of case, Judge Kozinski wrote: "White exploded the right of
publicity to include anything that brings the celebrity to mind."6
Though it appears reasonable minds could disagree, if the trier of fact
found that the robots bore no similarity to the plaintiffs, their claim
must fail.
D. Is the Use an Advertisement in Disguise?
In Stephano, the Court of Appeals of New York held for the
defendant New York Magazine in part based on an infrequently used
test in right of publicity cases: is the use "an advertisement in
disguise?"' 3 Another way to ask this question is: Does the use have
"no real relationship to the article? 26 This element of the four factor
test may be the most difficult for a court to determine as a question of
law. After all, just like trying to show in a trademark case that a
consumer was truly "confused," '' to conclusively prove that a use of a
plaintiff's persona though possibly newsworthy is nonetheless an
advertisement in disguise will clearly be difficult, but should by no
means be impossible.
In Robinson v. Snapple Beverage Corp.,26 a district court held
that the "Sugar Hill Gang," a rap group, had had its image wrongfully
260. Id. at 1286.
261. Id. In the same dissent Kozinski wrote: "As I predicted, White's voracious logic
swallows up rights conferred by Congress under the Copyright Act." Id. at 1285. "It's
inevitable that so broad and ill-defined a property right will trench on the rights of the
copyright holder." Id at 1286.
Another commentator regarded the Wendt decision with even more dread,
writing that if "Wendt is any indication of which direction this area of law is headed, then
the future appears bleak for federal copyright holders." Albano, supra note 254, at 263.
The author even attacks the moral labor theory justification of the Ninth Circuit's
decision. Arguing that the robots "bore none of the facial features of the actors who
portrayed the characters... because the actor's primary contribution in this context lies
with [his] physical likeness, and because that contribution is not explicitly used despite the
Ninth Circuit's attempts to reason otherwise, the notion that the actor should be given a
publicity right to protect her contribution is all but eliminated." If at 281. Albano
suggests moving to a pure work for hire agreement system. Id. at 278-80.
262. Id.
263. Stephano v. News Group Pub. Inc, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 185 (1984).
264. Id.
265. Trademark law "promotes the designation of a source as a method of preventing
consumer confusion and encouraging quality control." Maar, supra note 23, at 875.
266. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8534, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000).
used for advertising purposes in violation of the group members' right
of publicity, amongst other claims. The defendant used video footage
of the group performing at an event sponsored by the defendant to
promote another event sponsored by the defendant's product in a
commercial for the product and for the event."' The court quickly
dismisses the defendant's attempt to invoke the public interest
defense: "[w]hile the Games are certainly newsworthy and a matter of
public interest, the vignette... is clearly a solicitation of patronage
for the Games. The public interest exemption does not apply when
something is 'an advertisement in disguise.' Here, the Court is unable
to even find a disguise." ' The court concludes by citing a right of
privacy case where a plaintiff was victorious on the grounds that her
picture was used without permission in a calendar that was seen to be
a promotional vehicle for the defendant: "defendants cannot escape
liability by attempting to 'wrap their advertising message in the cloak
of public interest ....
Does the third element of the test work in a situation such as
Hoffman? As mentioned above, determining if a use is an
"advertisement in disguise" is a difficult task, yet use of the auxiliary
phrase "no real relationship to the use" can be helpful. In Hoffman,
the actor was not only placed in a dress other than the one worn in
the film, but the clothes were identified by the brand name: "Dustin
Hoffman isn't a drag in a butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler
and Ralph Lauren heels."270 While there is no doubt a convincing
argument could be made for parody, a just as convincing argument
could be made that this caption reads like an advertisement in a
fashion magazine2 7' Unfortunately for plaintiffs this is not an easy line
to draw, and the third element will only prove helpful to celebrities in
obvious situations.
Such a situation emerged in Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC.272 The Ninth
Circuit held for the former basketball star against the defendant car
company for using Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's given name ("Lew
267. Id. at 2-4. The product was Snapple, the second event was the 'Goodwill Games,'
an event mimicking the Olympics. Id
26& Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
269. Id. at 13, quoting Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical Ctr., Inc., 579 N.Y.2d
637, 641 (N.Y. 1991).
270. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d at 1103.
271. Of course one might debate, is it an advertisement in disguise for Richard Tyler
and Ralph Lauren or L.A. Magazine?
272. 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Alcindor") in a trivia question in 'an Oldsmobile commercial. 73
Despite Abdul-Jabbar having legally changed his name in 1971 for
religious reasons, the court refused to rule that he had "abandoned" it
and renounced all claims to future exploitation of it.r24 Stating that
"the appearance of an 'endorsement' is not the sine qua non of a
claim for commercial appropriation, "775 the court went out of its way
to explain that even though Abdul-Jabbar no longer used his given
name, it was still identified with him for commercial purposes 76 The
defense argued that its use of the name was exempt under the
California statutory newsworthy exception. m This was dismissed out
of hand by the Court, stating that "[w]hile Lew Alcindor's basketball
record may be said to be 'newsworthy,' its use is not automatically
privileged. GMC used the information in the context of an
automobile advertisement, not in a news or sports account." 278 With
courts having held commercials for commercial award shows
newsworthy,279 naked pictures newsworthy, m and computer-generated
"makeovers" newsworthy, 281 one certainly could not blame GMC for
thinking its use of a complimentary fact about an athlete was going to
be seen as newsworthy.2m
This matter would appear to be more easily determinable by
asking the third question of the four factor test: is the use an
advertisement in disguise?2m Oddly enough the likely answer is: no.
273. Id. at 409.
274. Id. at 411-12.
275. Id. at 414.
276. Id. at 412. The Court did hold that whether "Lew Alcindor" equals "Abdul
Jabbar" in the way in which the cartoon in Ali labeled "the Greatest" equaled Muhammed
Ali, or the robot in White equaled Vanna White, was a factual question. Id. at 416.
277. Id.
27& Id.
279. Welch v. Group W. Prods. Inc., 138 Misc. 2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
280. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
281. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d at 1180.
,282. Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC, 85 F.3d at 415.
283. The commercial in question: A disembodied voice asks, "How 'bout some
trivia?" This question is followed by the appearance of a screen bearing the printed words,
"You're Talking to the Champ." The voice then asks, "Who holds the record for being
voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?" In the screen appear the printed
words, "Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67, '68, '69." Next, the voice asks, "Has any car made the
'Consumer Digest's Best Buy' list more than once? [and responds:] The Oldsmobile
Eighty-Eight has." A seven-second film clip of the automobile, with its price, follows.
During the clip, the voice says, "In fact, it's made that list three years in a row. And now
you can get this Eighty-Eight special edition for just $18,995." At the end of the clip, a
message appears in print on the screen: "A Definite First Round Pick," accompanied by
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Though Abdul-Jabbar's name is used in a commercial, the use itself is
not commercial, and he would fail to meet the third factor. The
question asked in the commercial involves a sporting fact, a question
of history, in other words something that can be looked up. The
implication of the court's holding could be staggering.
Does such a ruling mean that a car company could not use a
trivia question involving a living former United States President in an
advertisement for a President's Day sale? After all, in this day and
age, the former President could make out a common law claim of
injury of lacking the ability to now endorse another car. He could
then, under Abdul-Jabbar, bring a statutory claim as no "appearance
of endorsement" is necessary. Furthermore, under the Ninth Circuit
reasoning, because the former President's name was used in an
automobile advertisement and not in a "news" account, a newsworthy
defense would not be available to the defendant either.24
E. Are Alternate Means of Conveying the Defendant's Message
Available?
The fourth and final element of the four factor test once again
borrows from the other intellectual property doctrines. Developed for
use in both trademark and copyright actions, some courts have
"adopted an 'alternative means of communication' test, pursuant to
which non-commercial speech is held infringing if there is another
way to convey the message without infringing intellectual property
the voice saying, "It's your money." A final printed message appears: "Demand Better, 88
by Oldsmobile." Id at 409.
284. As it happens this is not a far-fetched scenario. See Madow, supra note 49, at
n.262 (describing how in 1989, a cold medicine company used footage of Presidents Bush
and Gorbachev with the tagline "In the New Year, may the only cold war in the world be
the one we're fighting," without obtaining permission from either head of state. Two of
the major United States networks refused to run the commercial.); Two Networks Reject
Ad, Dec. 28, 1989 at A22, LEXIS News Library, File NYT (describing the past procedure
of the White House in similar circumstances was to send "stiff cease and desist orders.").
Furthermore, see Eben Shapiro, Rising Caution on Using Celebrity Images, Nov.
4, 1992 at D20, LEXIS News Library, File NYT (discussing that Saddam Hussein's
objection to use of his image in an unflattering manner in an advertisement for a provider
of treasury bills, was successful in having the advertising agency use Joseph Stalin as a
replacement). All of which leads to the question of has it always been like this? See LEO
BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME & ITS HISTORY 452-53 (1986) (discussing
mass publicity in the 1900s); Madow, supra note 49, at 150 ("[M]embers of the founding
generation such as Washington, Adams, and Jefferson... suffered commercialization of
their personas without apparent complaint.").
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rights." 8 Specifically, this test has been used in the trademark and
copyright context. In an action against the publishers of a book
essentially using Dr. Seuss's Cat in the Hat to tell a story about the
O.J. Simpson murder trial,26 the court in determining the use was not
allowed, explained: "[j]ust as in copyright, trademark infringement
will be excused only where necessary to the purpose of the use.
Where alternative means of achieving the satiric or parodic ends exist
that would not entail consumer confusion, the First Amendment will
not protect the parodist from being held to infringe. ' ' 87
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court, in drawing a
distinction between parody and satire in the copyright context, gave
parody a wide birth because it "needs to mimic an original to make its
point," m unlike its counterpart, satire, which "can stand on its own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing."
2 9
In other words, the Court is reluctant to protect a satire that takes
liberally from a single source, because there are alternate means of
the author satirizing his or her subject.290 The fourth element of the
four factor test proposes to use just such a test when analyzing rights
of publicity actions where not only has the First Amendment been
implicated, but the court has made a preliminary finding of
newsworthiness. Remember, to even reach step four of the test, a
plaintiff would have to successfully argue that her persona had been
evoked, its use was related to her public persona, and the use was an
advertisement in disguise.
One of the few right of publicity cases to utilize an alternative
means test was Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n.291 Cardtoons created a set of parody baseball cards, using take-
285. Lee, supra note 90, at 482. Such a test has been used in determining if the title of
an expressive work will be protected by the Eighth Circuit in Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
286. Dr. Seuss Enters., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal 1996),
aff'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (Defendant's book was entitled The
Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice. The book was supposed "to supply a 'fresh new
look' at the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial." The book's rhymes, illustrations, cover
and packaging were described by the court as "mimic[ing] the distinctive style of the
family of works created by Theodore S. Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss."). Id. at 1561.
287. Id. at 1573.
288. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994).
289. Id. at 581.
290. A standard example of such a distinction would be that while one could not
effectively parody "Star Wars" without referencing "Darth Vadar," one could certainly
satirize science fiction movies in general without having a character in a dark helmet who
breathes through a mask.
291. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
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offs on recognizable Major League Baseball players.292 The MLBPA
argued that the defendant had appropriated the players' right of
publicity. The court disagreed. 293 The defendants claimed a First
Amendment defense, sounding in newsworthiness. The MLBPA
countered that it should receive a lower standard of protection
because it was printed on a nontraditional medium of 
expression.294
The plaintiff's contention meshes well with McCarthy's
observation that "what is crucial" in right of publicity cases:
is the medium not the message. The courts have routinely denied
First Amendment immunity from right of publicity liability when
unpermitted use of identity is used even in 'messages' on T-shirts,
dishes, ashtrays, drinking mugs and the like. The result is usually
reached on the basis that these are not the usual media for social or
political messages 95
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit protected the speech all the same. The
court wrote that "[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment
... have never been limited to newspapers and books," 296 and found
that because the plaintiff's "commentary is on an important social
institution,' '2 ' it was fully protected speech.
Yet, most significantly, the court holds that the plaintiffs' right of
publicity action fails because:
Cardtoons' expression requires use of player identities because, in
addition to parodying the institution of baseball, the cards also
lampoon individual players. Further, Cardtoons' use of the trading
card format is an essential component of the parody because
baseball cards have traditionally been used to celebrate baseball
players and their accomplishments. Cardtoons expresses ideas
through the use of major league baseball player identities, and
MLBPA's attempts to enjoin the parody thus goes to the content of
the speech ....
In other words, as to the fourth element, the plaintiff would lose
in Cardtoons. But what about some of the above discussed cases?
The court in Grant, addressing the idea that its ruling for the
plaintiff might chill free speech took judicial notice that: "there is no
shortage of celebrities for an appropriate fee [who] are only too
happy to lend their faces, names and reputations for exploitations in
292. Id. at 962-63. Barry Bonds became "Treasury Bonds;" Ken Griffey, Jr. became
"Ken Spiffy, Jr." Id.
293. Id at 962.
294. Id. at 969.
295. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 7:6[A]
(1996).
296. 95 F.3d at 969.
297. Id.
29& Id. at 971-72 (emphasis added).
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such enterprises as the one here involved." Putting aside for a
moment the possibility that Cary Grant was specifically chosen for
the article because he never would have agreed to it, the court's
conclusion has the feel of accuracy: "[t]here is no conceivable artistic
or editorial purpose served by Mr. Grant's picture that would not
equally well have been served by any one of numerous other
celebrities."" Though Grant might not have an easy time meeting the
third element of the test, there is little question that he would be
successful as to part four.
But what about Elvis? 3°1 It would be hard to commemorate his
passing via an alternate means. Put another way, one cannot really
tell the story of Elvis, without Elvis. Perhaps a more difficult example
is Joe Montana. In Montana,0 the plaintiff's persona was used to
commemorate the championship victory of his team. There are of
course forty or more other players on the team, and then there are
coaches, and team logos, etc. Yet, to use any individual player, the
same right of publicity issue crops up. To use the team logo would
bring the defendant into the land of trademark. And of course,
Montana was the best known player on the team. Though it might be
a jury question, it certainly appears as if it would be very difficult to
convey the message of the San Francisco Forty Niners, in
photographic form, winning Super Bowl XXIII without the use of Joe
Montana.
However, the Court of Appeals of New York seemingly had a
perfect opportunity to stop the use of a plaintiff's persona, that was
entirely optional in Finger v. Omni Pubis., Int'l.,3 3 and did not. The
plaintiffs, who were not celebrities, brought an action under New
York's right of privacy statute against the publisher of Omni
magazine. A picture of the plaintiff and his wife and their six
children had been used as the cover picture in an article entitled
"Caffeine and Fast Sperm."3' The article was reporting on research
299. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
300. Id.
301. See Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979).
302. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995).
303. 77 N.Y.2d. 138 (NY 1990).
304. It should be noted that New York as of Stephano in 1984, does not recognize a
right of publicity and hears all such cases under its Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51. These laws
lean closer to a right to privacy than to publicity. Oddly, this should have made the
plaintiff's case even stronger, but did not.
305. 77 N.Y.2d. at 140.
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regarding the possible enhancement of in vitro fertilization rates by
"exposing sperm to high concentrations of caffeine."' ' The caption
beneath the picture was "Want a big family? Maybe your sperm
needs a cup of Java in the morning. Tests reveal that caffeine-spritzed
sperm swim faster, which may increase the chances for in vitro
fertilization."' '° Amazingly, none of the plaintiff's six children were
conceived by in vitro fertilization. There was no mention in the
article of the plaintiff or his family. 3°9
The plaintiff's claim, that his picture was being used without his
consent "for advertising purposes or for the purpose of trade," seems
perfectly logical and the court appears to agree: "[wle have
repeatedly observed that the prohibitions of Civil Rights Law §§ 50
and 51 are to be strictly limited to nonconsensual commercial
appropriation of the name, portrait or picture of a living person."'3 10
Here, the plaintiff was living, he had not given his consent, and a
magazine article with which he had no connection surely seemed to
be commercial. However, the court used the newsworthy/public
interest exception and denied the plaintiff's claim that he had no real
relationship to the article.311
The court opined that:
Clearly... there is a "real relationship" between the fertility theme
of the article and the large family depicted in the photograph. That
the article also discusses in vitro fertilization as being enhanced by
"caffeine-spritzed sperm" does no more than discuss a specific
aspect of fertilization and does not detract from the relationship
between the photograph and the article.312
The Second Circuit's holding is very difficult to reconcile with
common sense. What average individual would pick up a magazine
with an article about in vitro fertilization, with a picture on the front
page of a large family, and not make a connection between the two?
As none of the plaintiffs were conceived via in vitro fertilization,
there seems little question that alternate means were available to
communicate this message.
In conclusion, the alternate means test is the most common sense
element of all four elements of the test. Although all four factors
could themselves become jury questions, the answer to the question
306. Id.
307. Id.
30& Id. at 142
309. Id at 140
310. Id. at 141.
311. Id. at 142-43.
312 Id. at 143.
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of whether the use was necessary to convey the message at hand is
likely to be a relatively easily discernable one. Of course, as
previously stated, a victory for the plaintiff on the fourth factor only
puts the plaintiff on an even playing field with the defendant. It is
only if the plaintiff makes it this far, that a court has to consider
whether the right of publicity in a given action can trump the First
Amendment.
V. Other Tests
While a variety of commentators have proposed methods for
resolving the tension between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity,3 13 this section will analyze two prominent theories
propounded recently by two state Supreme Courts. The first is a
transformative balancing test, developed by the Supreme Court of
California in 2001 in the Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup,
Inc.314 holding. In the second decision a predominant use test was
established by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Doe v. TCI
Cablevision.5 While both tests have value, neither requires a court to
examine enough elements to allow plaintiffs and defendants to be
assured of a consistent holding time after time.
A. The Comedy III Test
Comedy III Productions, the registered owner of all rights to the
former comedy act known as the Three Stooges brought a right of
publicity action against Gary Saderup, an artist who created a
charcoal portrait of the Three Stooges.316 Saderup sold the portrait on
both lithographs and T-shirts. The court acknowledged there was no
implication that the "portraits""3 7  were an advertisement or
endorsement of a product or service, and therefore its holding could
potentially have an explosive effect on the First Amendment and the
right of publicity.3""
313. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 230 (advocating a modified fair use analysis); Kwall,
supra note 49 (advocating a property and liability analysis); Samuelson, supra note 28
(advocating an adoption of copyright's fair use defense).
314. 25 Cal. 4th 387, 387 (2001).
315. 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
316. Comedy III Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 393. Although this action was brought under
California's statute which allows for the descendability of publicity rights (CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344.1). the Comedy III test has been used both in and out of California in actions
brought by the living.
317. Comedy III Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 396.
318. If the court were to hold that Saderup's drawings and subsequent exploitation
(Saderup had sold 1,415 lithographs and 2,265 T-shirts by the time of trial. Dougherty,
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The court appeared cognizant of these ramifications, stating that
the "right to self-expression is inherent in any political system which
respects individual dignity. Each speaker must be free of government
restraint regardless of the nature or manner of the views expressed
unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary."319 Expanding on
this thought process, the court stated:
It is admittedly not a simple matter to develop a test that will
unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression
protected by the First Amendment and those that must give way to
the right of publicity. Certainly any such test must incorporate the
principle that the right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First
Amendment, be a right to control the celebrity's image by
censoring disagreeable portrayals. Once the celebrity thrusts
himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment
dictates that the right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make
other expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad
scope.
However, relying on Zacchini, the court forms a test based on
the idea that the state's interest in providing a right of publicity is not
automatically trumped by the First Amendment, "rather as in the
case of defamation, the state law interest and the interest in free
expression must be balanced, according to the relative importance of
the interests at stake." 32' The court holds that "an action for
infringement of the right of publicity can be maintained only if the
proprietary interests at issue clearly outweigh the value of free
expression.'322
Accordingly, the court's new "balancing test between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity [is] based on whether the work
in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.
' 3
This transformative balancing test, is adopted from the first factor of
supra note 94, at 18-19), were protected speech, the potential effect would be that "an
enormous source of celebrity wealth recognized for decades would be lost." Dougherty,
supra note 94, at 19. Professor Dougherty is referring to other celebrities, not simply the
Three Stooges. Id.
319. Comedy III Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 397. Furthermore, the court implies that the
medium in which the work appears will not be seen as dispositive stating, "[n]or does the
fact that Saderup's art appears in large part on a less conventional avenue of
communications, T-shirts, result in reduced First Amendment protection." Id. at 399.
320. Id. at 403. The court added that the "right of publicity derived from public
prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire. Rather,
prominence invites creative comment." Id at 397.
321. Id. at 401.
322. Id. at 402, quoting Gugliehni v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d at 860, 871
(1979).
323. Comedy III Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 391.
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the copyright fair use doctrine:3 4 the "purpose and character of the
work." 325 The first factor is grounded in a determination of whether
the work in question is transformative3 2 The court reasons that the
underlying justification for the test is that "when a work contains
significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of
First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with
the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.
32
The test is essentially "whether a product containing a celebrity's
likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant's own expression rather the celebrity's likeness. . ."'2 and
this "inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements
predominate in the work."329 However, the court provides no
guidance in how other courts should make such determinations and
by not doing so only encourages jurists to be art critics. As noted
above, this is the last role our society has envisioned for those trained
solely in the law.33  In the alternative, such a question of
transformativeness could easily lead to a new brand of expert
testimony: the is-it-imitative-or-is-it-creative expert. Soon these
experts could flood the courts testifying as to the literalness of a
depiction.
Although the Comedy III court stated that the "test we articulate
today.., does not express a value judgment or preference for one
type of depiction over another," 33 it is hard to believe the court. By
elucidating a test that emphasizes that which is not literally depictive
of celebrity over that which is, the court has not simply stopped the
Saderup's of the world. The unintended consequences of the
324. Id at 404.
325. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2003).
326. Id., citing Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). "This inquiry
into whether a work is 'transformative' appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any
judicial attempt to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment." Comedy III
Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 404.
327. Id. at 405. The court unfortunately provides no evidence for its conclusion that a
transformative work will be less likely to effect the economic interest intended to be
protected by the right of publicity. In fact, one could argue that such a theory is in direct
contrast to the theory of the tragedy of the commons. See Hardin, supra note 55. But see
Dougherty, supra note 94, at 25 (arguing that works that are not a true representation of
the celebrity "are not likely to be good substitutes for authorized celebrity memorabilia").
328. Comedy III Prods, 25 Cal. 4th at 406 (defining expression as "something other
than the likeness of the celebrity").
329. Id. at 407.
330. See note 110 and accompanying text.
331. Id. at 409.
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transformative test could surpass the court's intent very quickly. To
name only one example, may performers no longer imitate celebrities
because their depictions are too close to the real thing? Perhaps only
the good imitators will be enjoined though, because the celebrity
impersonators that are not convincing, will no longer be seen as poor
imitations of the original, they will now be labeled "creative." It
certainly appears that the Comedy III court's transformative test
made a value determination that the statutory right of publicity can,
and at times should, trump the First Amendment.
B. The Predominant Use Test
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,332 the plaintiff, former professional
hockey player Anthony "Tony" Twist333 brought a misappropriation
action 334 against the creator of the comic book Spawn.335 The plaintiff's
complaint was based on a character named "Anthony 'Tony Twist'
Twistelli" that the defendant openly admitted was based on the
plaintiff.336 Twist won a jury verdict for $24,500,000, but the court
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.33
In a right of publicity action in Missouri the:
[P]laintiff must prove that defendant intended to obtain a
commercial advantage, and it is not enough to show that defendant
incidentally obtained a commercial advantage by using plaintiff's
name or that defendant had some other purpose in using plaintiff's
name other than to obtain a commercial advantage.
332. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
333. Twist was mainly known for his "violent tactics" as a player in the National
Hockey League. Id at 366.
334. The actions sounded in "misappropriation of name and defamation." Id. at 365.
However, the defendant invoked a First Amendment defense and the court acknowledged
that although the damages are different, the "elements of the two torts [misappropriation
and the right of publicity] are essentially the same." Id. at 368.
335. Described as a "dark and surreal fantasy centered on a character named Al
Simmons, a CIA assassin who was killed... and descended to hell .... Simmons, having
made a deal with the devil, was transformed into the creature Spawn and returned to earth
to commit various violent and sexual acts on the devil's behalf." Id. at 366. The action was
brought against various companies associated with the comic book series. Id. at 367.
336. Id. at 366. The "fictional 'Tony Twist' is a Mafia don whose list of evil deeds
includes multiple murders, abduction of children and sex with prostitutes." Id. The creator
of the series was an "avowed hockey fan" and on more than one occasion spoke about
how the Tony Twist character was based on the plaintiff. Id. at 366.
337. Id. at 365.
33& Id. at 369.
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However it is "irrelevant whether defendant intended to injure the
plaintiff or actually succeeded in obtaining a commercial advantage
from using plaintiff's name." '339
Not surprisingly, the court uses "commercial advantage" as the
foundation of its test, explaining that the "threshold legal question [is]
whether the use ... is 'expressive,' in which case it is fully protected,
or 'commercial' in which case it is generally not protected."'
4
Examples such as news or entertainment are usually expressive and
fall under the protection of the test, while purely commercial uses,
like those for goods or services will "rarely" be protected. 4' The
Missouri Supreme Court then distinguishes its test from the Comedy
III test by pointing to the possibility that an expressive work,
regardless of whether it is commercially exploiting the plaintiff will be
a protected work if transformative under Comedy III.
However, the Doe court's predominant use test is designed to
address works that are both expressive and commercial by holding
that even a use with expressive elements will be held violative of the
First Amendment if its primary purpose is one of commerciality. 342 At
the same time, a work that is mainly designed to "make an expressive
comment on or about a celebrity," will likely be protected, as the
predominant purpose of the use is to make the expressive comment. 4
Although the Missouri court's predominant use test is much
younger than the Comedy III transformative test, that has not
prevented at least one commentator from already questioning its
effectiveness. He asks what about the:
[u]se of a private person's persona, such as the girls caught flashing
in the "Girls Gone Wild" videos? And what if the "expressive
comment" is the image itself, such as a picture book of celebrities?
How is the finder of fact supposed to distinguish a "predominant
purpose" of making an expressive comment from that of making a
buck, when the two go hand in hand?4
Perhaps even more problematic is the determination of exactly
what is expressive and what is commercial. As discussed in Part IV,A
and B above, neither are easily made distinctions and one would
suspect continued erratic holdings based on a test that calls for a court
not only to determine if a work is expressive, but if it is
339. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 371, citing MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 3.28.
340. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373.
341. Id.
342 Id. at 374.
343. Id., quoting Lee, supra note 90, at 500.
344. Moore, supra note 12, at 6.
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predominantly commercial. Beyond the obvious fact patterns, this
test does not appear to be a vast improvement on the Comedy III test.
VI. Testing the Four Factors
This penultimate section will apply the above four factor test to
four relatively recent and influential right of publicity cases involving
the First Amendment. It should be remembered that if the plaintiff
fails to show any of the elements of the test, it will lose, while even if
all four elements are proven by the plaintiff, a victory is not
guaranteed. The four factors are: Does the use evoke the image or
persona of the plaintiff? Is the use related to the plaintiff's public
persona? Is the use an advertisement in disguise? Are alternate means
of conveying the defendant's message available?
A. Testing The Stooges
345
As discussed in Part IV, a determination of the
newsworthiness/public interest of Gary Saderup's charcoal sketch,
just as with all other similar works is less a science than an art. The
California Supreme Court determined that the work was commercial
art, and therefore not deserving of the "high degree of First
Amendment protection for noncommercial speech about
celebrities .... 3 Nevertheless, the court decided that the work is art,
and recognized that even commercial art is deserving of some
protection, after all, as one commentator has noted "like
entertainment, art is protected speech. '' 47
Yet, the court wanting to avoid the role of art critic, created the
following standard to help make its decision as to the protectability of
Saderup's work: "does the marketability and economic value of the
challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity
345. Comedy III will be treated as if the plaintiffs were alive, thereby avoiding the
some of the descendability issues that might otherwise arise.
346. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 399 (2001). It was the
determination that Saderup's work was not expressive speech, but not an advertisement
either that led the court to develop its 'transformative test.'
347. Dougherty, supra note 94, at 16, citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). Though one may quibble with Saderup's
rendering of the Three Stooges being classified as "art," the California Supreme Court in
Comedy III contrasts Saderup's drawing of the Three Stooges with that of Andy Warhols'
renderings of "such celebrities as Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley."
25 Cal. 4th at 408-09.
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depicted?" 348 Of course if the answer is "no," then the artist would be
in the clear. Additionally, the court explains, if the "value of the
work" is derived from a "source" different than the actual celebrity,
be it the artist's "creativity, skill and [or] reputation ... it may be
presumed that sufficient transformative elements are present to
warrant First Amendment protection. " 3"9
The Court refers to the late Andy Warhol as an example of an
artist who produced "celebrity portraits" that were protected by the
First Amendment because through "distortion and the careful
manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message that
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images and
became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumanization of
celebrity itself."35 The court's use of Warhol and a test that examines
the reputation of the artist, has been derided by one commentator
because: "aside from extreme cases, it is difficult to measure an
artists' fame and weigh it against that of the subject. Under this test,
presumably Andy Warhol could sell copies of literal depictions of
anyone, except perhaps someone more famous than he is. One
wonders who that would include."'3 51
Saderup argued that "all portraiture involves creative decisions,"
and "that therefore, no portrait portrays a mere literal likeness, and
that accordingly all portraiture, including reproductions, is protected
by the First Amendment. 35 2 However, the court was not listening:
We reject any such categorical position. Without denying that all
portraiture involves the making of artistic choices, we find it
equally undeniable, under [the transformative] test, that when an
artist's skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal
of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist's right of free
expression is outweighed by the right of publicity.353
The court uses all of two paragraphs to determine that despite
Saderup's "undeniable skill," such skill was "subordinated to the
overall goal of creating literal, conventional depictions of the Three
34& Id. at 407. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has boiled down this part of the Comedy III reasoning to: "whether it is the art or
the celebrity that is being sold or displayed." 200 F. Supp. 2d 340,349 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
349. 25 Cal. 4th at 407. The reputation test seems a bit unreliable. After all, if a famous
artist made the same sketch as Saderup, and put it on T-shirts, but if the public knew the
artist, does that mean the work is transformative?
350. Id. at 408-09.
351. Dougherty, supra note 94, at 48.
352. 25 Cal. 4th at 408.
353. Id. (emphasis added).
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Stooges so as to exploit their fame."3 4 Accordingly, because the
"marketability and economic value" of the work "derived primarily
from the fame of the celebrities depicted,"355 the work is not
transformative, and because Saderup's work did not possess the
necessary significant creative elements to be transformative, the lower
courts' ruling in favor of Comedy III was affirmed.3  Without pause
the court justifies this ruling on the basis of its theory that if it held
the drawing transformative and protected by the First Amendment
"we cannot perceive how the right of publicity would remain a viable
right other than in cases of falsified celebrity endorsements. ' 37
However, as one commentator has noted, under the Comedy III
test, if a court were to determine that a "particular work of art is
transformative, then presumably it can be attached to any unrelated
product and sold." 36 Therefore, "[r]ather than regulating the sale of
image merchandise otherwise associated with the person depicted,
the transformativeness rule prevents the dissemination of copies of
pictorial works assessed by a judge to be insufficiently creative and is
likely to chill the creation of pictorial works portraying real people." 359
Another commentator uses a hypothetical "sequel to 'The Fugitive'
starring a digital version of Harrison Ford [which] would be protected
as a 'transformative' work," to demonstrate the "patently absurd
result" of the test. 3° Few would argue that an Andy Warhol "Marilyn
Monroe" ashtray being approved while a Gary Saderup "Three
Stooges" T-shirt is held impermissible seems to be in opposition to
361common sense.
Yet, for present purposes it shall be assumed that a court did not
find the work in question to be expressive per se as it is not fictional
like Rogers or factual like Dora. However, if a nude picture of Ann-
Margret or a commercial for a commercial award show are held to be
of interest to the public, surely a finely wrought, accurate artistic
354. Id. at 409. Ironically, there is little doubt that it actually took a great deal of Mr.




358. Dougherty, supra note 94, at 70.
359. Id.
360. Moore, supra note 12, at 6. Moore contends the Comedy III transformative
balancing test is "rather rudderless." Id.
361. In Comedy III the court actually writes: "[n]or does the fact that Saderup's art
appears in large part on a less conventional avenue of communications, T-shirts, result in




rendering of the Three Stooges could hold a similar interest.362 And, if
there were such public interest, how would the plaintiff in Comedy III
have fared under the four factor test?
It can be easily shown that Comedy III would pass the first
element, as a portrait of the Three Stooges is certainly evocative of
the comedy troupe. As to the element of the purpose of the use of the
persona, as the Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. 63 court might
have said, there is no constitutional right to the use of the Three
Stooges as the Three Stooges. Hence, the plaintiff would succeed on
the second element. However, it is on the third step of the test that
Comedy III Productions would clearly fail. The use of a portrait of
the Three Stooges, be it in T-shirt or lithograph form is not an
advertisement in disguise any more than a print of a Monet painting is
an advertisement in disguise. 4 Unless one were to attempt to argue
that the portrait of Larry, Moe and Curley was an advertisement for
blank white T-shirts, it is difficult to separate this version of art from a
Warhol celebrity rendering. Accordingly, the defendant would be
successful under the four factor/First Amendment analysis.6
B. LaFaceing the Music
The second recent decision was delivered in 2003 by a panel in
the Sixth Circuit.366 The plaintiff, famed civil rights activist Rosa
Parks,367 brought an action for violation of her common law right of
362. Perhaps the work that has been reviewed above that hues closest to Comedy III is
the artist's rendering of Joe Montana in Montana. However, that the picture was created
for a newspaper, such a traditionally protected medium of expression makes direct
comparisons difficult.
363. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See note 249 and accompanying text.
364. It should be noted that such logic should not be extended indefinitely. If Saderup
instead of simply creating a portrait and putting it on T-shirts and lithographs, made Three
Stooges Pez dispensers, clearly the use would be an advertisement in disguise for selling
Pez. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 2d 813, 851 (1979) (Bird, C.J. dissenting)
("the sale of such objects as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target games,
candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods [emblazoned with Lugosi-as-Dracula]...
hardly implicates the First Amendment."). But see Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that speech can be disseminated both for free and for profit, and
that "[m]useum gift shops sell merchandise that, in general, replicates the art displayed in
the museum, thus enabling the museum to distribute art in a common and ordinary form
that can be appreciated in everyday life."). Id. at 354.
365. For the sake of completeness, the defendant would win the fourth test as well,
since there is no sufficiently accurate alternate means of picturing the Three Stooges
beyond the use of a likeness of the Three Stooges.
366. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
367. Parks achieved national recognition in 1955 by refusing to yield her seat on a bus
to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama, as segregation laws of the time required.
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publicity under Michigan law,36 against the record producers of the
recording artists OutKast, for their song "Rosa Parks."36 The chorus
of the song was "Ah, ha, hush that fuss[.] Everybody move to the
back of the bus., 370 The trial court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the publicity claim, despite determining that
the chorus of the song was clearly related to the plaintiff's name and
fame, and such a relationship was "so obvious that the matter is not
open to reasonable debate."3 71
The Sixth Circuit overturned the district court decision on the
right of publicity and trademark claims.372 The court defined the
plaintiff's burden in such a case to be a demonstration "that she has a
pecuniary interest in her identity, and that her identity has been
commercially exploited by [the] defendant. '' 73 The court explained
that such a burden had been met because:
We believe that reasonable people could find that the use of Rosa
Parks' name as the title to this song was not justified as being
metaphorical or symbolic of anything for which Rosa Parks is
famous. To the contrary, reasonable people could find that the
name was appropriated solely because of the vastly increased
marketing power of a product bearing the name of a national
heroine of the civil rights movement. 374
The court then attempted to "apply a legal standard of 'artistic
relevance' in order to balance the rights of the parties and in so
doing, held that an "[aipplication of that standard involves a
recognition that Rosa Parks has no right to control her image by
censoring disagreeable portrayals. 3 75 Yet, in a lucid assessment of the
rights of artists in a publicity action, the court wrote there must be a
"recognition that the First Amendment cannot permit anyone who
A boycott of the city buses which lasted more than one year followed Park's action and
"eventually became a catalyst for organized boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations all across
the South." Id at 442.
368. Parks also alleged false advertising under the Lanham Act, defamation and
tortious interference with a business relationship. Id. at 441.
369. Id at 442.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 452.
372. Parks, 329 F.3d at 463.
373. Id. at 460. Both parties stipulated as to the plaintiff's fame and the defendant's
did not dispute they had named their song after Parks, but claimed a "First Amendment
right of artistic expression." Id.
374. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). This was opposed to the district court's opinion that
the line in the chorus was a "statement by OutKast to competing rappers that their work is
of 'lesser quality' than OutKast's and therefore other rappers should 'take a backseat' to
OutKast." ENT. L. REP., Vol. 25, No. 5, 11 (2003).
375. Parks, 329 F.3d at 463.
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cries 'artist' to have carte blanche when it comes to naming and
advertising his works. 3 76 The Sixth Circuit held that whether OutKast
"filch[ed]" Rosa Parks' name should be left to a trier of fact and
reversed and remanded for retrial.37
Is the use of Rosa Parks' name in a hip hop song newsworthy or
in the public interest? Although a gut reaction might say, "neither,"
there is little question that a court would hold that the use of the
name itself is a protected form of expression. In its holding for the
defendant in Rogers v. Grimaldi378 the district court quoted the United
States Supreme Court, "[e]ntertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast
by radio and television and live entertainment, such as musical and
dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee." 379 The
Second Circuit in its affirmation of Rogers held that "[m]ovies, plays,
books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic expression and
deserve protection. " 380 However, the court continued, if the plaintiff
could demonstrate there was "no artistic relevance to the underlying
work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, [if] the title
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work," only
then could protection under the First Amendment be removed.31
However, a song that uses the phrase "Ah ha, hush that fuss[.]
Everybody move to the back of the bus," 38 would seem to contain at
least a modicum of artistic relevance to the publicly known persona of
Rosa Parks. Accordingly, there is no dispute that the use of Ms. Parks
name evokes her public persona, hence meeting the first factor of the
four factor test. While one might argue as to whether the use here is
actually related to the plaintiff's public persona, 383 if the use is deemed
artistically relevant and therefore protected, it is only because the
song is at least tangentially related to the public image of Rosa Parks.
Though it might be a close call, the second element is satisfied.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
379. Id. at 116, quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
380. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (1989).
381. Id. at 999.
382. Parks, 329 F.3d at 442.
383. See note 371 and accompanying text (discussing the true motivations for using
Ms. Parks' name).
The third factor would be a difficult one to address as well.
Despite the usual status of songs as protected speech, _W a strong case
could be made that the only reason Parks' name was being used was
to attract commercial attention to the Outkast record. If this could be
proven at trial, Parks might have an outside chance of winning this
part of the test. Admittedly such an argument would be an uphill
climb, and if the plaintiff failed to convince the court the defendant
would win the four factor test automatically.
For the sake of argument though, if the plaintiff were to prevail
on the third count, which is unlikely, it would have an excellent
chance of prevailing on the fourth element of the test. There must be
alternative ways to communicate the message that Outkast was
intending to send to its listeners, without the appropriation of Ms.
Parks' persona. Overall, under the four part test, unless Parks was
able to convince a court that the sole motivation for the use of her
name as the title of the song was as an advertisement in disguise, the
defendant would be victorious.
C. Testing "Tiger"
The third action is the Sixth Circuit's holding against Eldrick
"Tiger" Woods under the Ohio common law right of publicity. In
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,3 Woods, chairman of the board
of ETW, brought a right of publicity3m action against the publisher of
Rick Rush's artwork. Rush's work was a painted image of Woods,
commemorating his winning of the Master's golf tournament in
Augusta, Georgia, in 1997.38' Woods has assigned the "exclusive right
384. See supra note 378 and accompanying text (arguing songs are invariably
protected).
385. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
386. Id. at 919. ETW also alleged a variety of trademark violations under the Lanham
Act and unfair competition and deceptive trade practices under Ohio law. ETW's
trademark claim failed as the Sixth Circuit held: "ETW asks us, in effect, to constitute
Woods himself as a walking, talking trademark. Images and likenesses of Woods are not
protectable as a trademark because they do not perform the trademark function of
designation ... as a general rule, a person's image or likeness cannot function as a
trademark." Id. at 922.
387. IL at 918. Woods was the youngest competitor to ever win the tournament and
did so by a record-setting margin. Id. The image presents three different views of Woods,
his caddy and a competitor's caddy all in the foreground. In the background is a row of
past winners of the tournament, and behind them is the scoreboard for the tournament.
The past winners include Arnold Palmer, Sam Snead, Ben Hogan, Walter Hagen, Bobby
Jones and Jack Nicklaus. Jireh created a series of "limited edition prints"-two hundred
and fifty large serigraphs and five thousand smaller lithographs of the work, which was
entitled "The Masters of Augusta." Id at 919.
CAN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AFFORD FREE SPEECH?2004]
228 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [27:1
to exploit his name, image, likeness and signature, and all other
publicity rights" to ETW.3
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
on all counts, based mainly on the strength of its First Amendment
affirmative defense, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on all counts. The
panel quoted the Comedy III holding: "Saderup's portraits were
entitled to First Amendment protection because they were
'expressive works and not an advertisement or endorsement of a
product."' 9 Referring to Rush's painting confusing anyone as to its
source, the court predicted: "[n]o reasonable person could believe
that merely because these photographs or paintings contain Woods'
likeness or image, they all originated with Woods."3 9 The majority
strongly believed that Rush's image had "substantial informational
and creative content, 3 91 and hence found the work transformative.
After "balancing the societal and personal interests embodied in the
First Amendment against Woods' property rights, we conclude that
the effect of limiting Woods' right of publicity in this case is negligible
and significantly outweighed by society's interest in freedom of
artistic expression. ' 3" 92
388. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d at 918. Additionally, ETW holds a
trademark in the mark "Tiger Woods," for "use in connection with 'art prints, calendars,
mounted photographs, notebooks, pencils, pens, posters, trading cards, and unmounted
photographs." Id.
389. Id. at 935, quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396
(2001). The court noted that Saderup lost due to his paintings being found to fail the
transformative test. Id
390. Id. at 923.
391. Id. at 937. It is these types of holdings that led one commentator to ask "should
constitutional protection turn on a judge's view as to whether a work of art is simple-
minded and imitative, or instead conveys 'ironic social comment?' Lewis R. Clayton, THE
NATIONAL L.J., July 16, 2001, A23. Perhaps ironically, in its Amici brief on behalf of
Jireh, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of The Press argued against judges being
put "in the position of deciding whether a use was sufficiently creative or newsworthy to
be permitted." ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 615.
392. Id. at 938. A celebrity like Woods only serves to highlight the greatest paradox of
the right of publicity: a celebrity that is worth more in endorsement money than he is for
the activity that made him famous to begin with is seen as being less entitled to a strong
protection of any future exploitation because he has been so successful at exploiting his
persona already. In this particular action it was to Woods' detriment that he had become
"an important element of the shared communicative resources of our cultural domain."
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d at 933, quoting Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
Woods falls into that small category which has seen "[a]n entire industry... develop [
]around the merchandising and commercial exploitation of endorsements which often
surpass the monies earned directly through performance by entertainers and sports stars."
Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Celebrity Rights Law Needed in New York, N.Y.
L.J., at 1 (1995).
In respect to the four-factor test, while the sides in Jireh clashed
over the transformative nature of the work, neither side quibbled
about the protected nature of a portrait in terms of its public interest.
In fact, a strong case could be made for the painting attaining the
status of newsworthy as it pictured the star of a major sporting
event.3'9 In either case, Jireh should easily make it to the four factor
test. Clearly, the painting of Woods evokes his image, and he is shown
golfing, the activity that made him famous, so both the first and
second elements have been fulfilled. Although the dissent would
disagree,394 by using the same rationale as used above for Comedy III,
one should ask: if Rush is using Woods image as an advertisement in
disguise, what is he advertising? What Rush is selling is his rendering
of Woods. The same as Warhol or Saderup before him. Which of the
three is the most or least artistic should be left to the art critics, not
the courts; the plaintiff fails on the third factor93 The Sixth Circuit
was correct in holding for Jireh and the First Amendment.
D. A Test for Tony Twist
As described above, Doe v. TCI Cablevision396 involves the use of
the plaintiff Tony Twist's name and some of his characteristics as the
basis for an unflattering comic book character. The Missouri Supreme
Court, invoking its newly created predominant purpose of the use
test, held that as the use of the plaintiff's name was not a parody:
393. In other words, were Rush a photographer, no one would question his right to
take a picture of Woods and sell it to a magazine. See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304
N.Y. 354 (1952) (holding that the use of a name or picture in a newspaper, magazine, or
newsreel, in connection with an item of news of one that is newsworthy, is not a use for
purposes of trade, and therefore is not a violation of New York's right to privacy statute).
But see Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.RI. 1988) (holding that the subject of
the famous "Kissing Sailor" photo taken on VJ Day in Times Square had his likeness
misappropriated by defendant's selling prints of the picture for $1,600 each).
394. "It is difficult to discern any appreciable transformative or creative contribution
in Defendant's prints so as to entitle them to First Amendment protection." 332 F.3d at
959 (Clay, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
[A]lthough it is apparent that Rush is an adequately skilled artist, after viewing
the prints in question it is also apparent that Rush's ability in this regard is
subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, conventional depictions of
Tiger Woods so as to exploit his... fame such that Rush's right of free
expression is outweighed by Wood's right of publicity.
Id.
395. Also similarly to Comedy III, the plaintiff would fail on the fourth element as
well; after all, it would be hard to tell the story of Tiger Woods winning the Masters
without Tiger Woods.
396. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) reh'g denied by McFarlane v. Twist, 2004 U.S. LEXIS
76 (US 2004). See Section VI.B for factual background.
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or other expressive comment or a fictionalized account of the real
Twist ... . [Such use] has very little literary value compared to its
commercial value. [Therefore] the use and identity of Twist's name
has become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related
products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and under
these circumstances, free speech must give way to the right of
publicity.
397
The court essentially held there was nothing newsworthy or in
the public interest about this use of the plaintiff's name, a startling
finding of a use involving a comic book, a use that is so traditionally
398protected. Yet, because the "respondents agree.., that the use was
not a parody. . .,399 it makes it difficult to disagree with the court's
holding. After all, there is no question that the story is not true to life,
and if it is not parody or a "fictionalized account of the real Twist,"
' 0
the arguments for expressiveness seem to evaporate. Doe would most
likely not be held newsworthy or in the public interest and
accordingly would fail to even reach the four factors test.
However, if Doe made it to the four factors, the defendant would
likely prevail. While Twist is certainly evoked by the use of his name,
the use of his likeness as a "Mafia don whose list of evil deeds
includes multiple murders, abduction of children and sex with
prostitutes,"40' would seem to range far afield from playing hockey.
Although it appears the defendant is being rewarded for so altering
the persona of the plaintiff, this is intentional. After all, if the use
were deleterious to the plaintiff, he could surely bring a defamation
action. As far as the right of publicity is concerned, it should be
victorious in Doe, as the defendant is unable to even put the "puck in
play."
VII. Conclusion
As the right of publicity enters into its second fifty years, it has
begun to bash heads with that most obstinate of foes, the First
Amendment. While some argue that the right has intruded too far
onto the sacred ground of the right of free speech, others would argue
the opposite: that the First Amendment has rendered the right of
publicity useless. The right of publicity is hampered less by doctrinal
397. Id. at 374.
398. One suspects that defendants' repeated admissions in both interviews prior to
trial and at trial that the character was based on the plaintiff was a very influential factor
in the decision by the court. See note 334 and accompanying text.
399. 110 S.W.3d at 374.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 366.
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conundrums than a continuing struggle for its true raison d'atre. The
Jireh decision provides a classic example of a court struggling with the
issue of not "how" to enforce the right of publicity, but "for
whom"should it be enforced?
The court explains its holding against Woods by reasoning "in
the absence of his right of publicity, [Woods] would still be able to
reap substantial financial rewards from authorized appearances and
endorsements."4' It is hard to believe that the court would necessarily
have held the same way if the plaintiff had not been a multi-
millionaire. Or at the very least, it would have adhered closer to the
First Amendment justification in its decision. In support of the
majority's reasoning, a group of law professors has argued that they
"doubt that Tiger Woods would have lacked the motivation to excel
as a professional golfer if he knew that, should he become famous, he
could not license out his image for posters and other memorabilia." 43
This argument does not hold much legal water.
Either the right of publicity in the United States is worthy of
protection, or it is not. To continue to put our courts in the position of
determining if a given celebrity would have been motivated if they
knew what might happen to their right of publicity in the future
appears to be an awfully crude means of producing consistent
decisions.
As one practitioner writes, the overwhelming fear of chilling free
speech has led to a broad leeway given to free expression, so much so
that "merely to be sued is to lose, even if the defendant ultimately
wins the case."'' Despite some recent decisions for defendants, the
best course of action for possible future defendants is to negotiate for
and obtain licensing agreements from the celebrity in question or to
not use the celebrity persona at all. At the same time, Professor
Madow argues that until a "clear and convincing showing is made that
402. ETW v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003). How does the
court know what the future holds for the plaintiff? While at the time of a given action a
celebrity might be fabulously famous and wealthy, "fame and reputation are not static, but
rather can change during and after a person's life." Dougherty, supra note 94, at 48. Aside
from the possible "tragedy of the commons" (see Hardin, supra note 55 and accompanying
discussion), is society now dictating that one cannot exploit their own 'property' to the
fullest extent that they wish? And if society has made such a determination, should such a
determination be made by an unelected judiciary?
403. Brief of Amici Curiae of 73 Law Professors in Support of Defendant/Appellee
Jireh Publishing, Inc., at 28, ETW v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003)
(No. 00-3584). The professors add that many other countries, (England amongst them) do
not recognize the right of publicity in any way.
404. Moore, supra note 12, at 6.
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very substantial social interests will thereby be served" no right of
publicity should be recognized.
It is due to these conflicts that the four factor test was developed.
The test should help courts make consistent, logical rulings in right of
publicity actions that implicate the First Amendment. Until our
legislatures at either the federal or state level have come to more
consistent terms with how the right of publicity is to be treated by our
jurists, a steadying hand is needed to create reliable decisions time
after time. By borrowing from the existing doctrines of intellectual
property and crafting a test that is geared towards protecting free
speech but not at the cost of eliminating the right of publicity, the
four factor test should provide all parties with stability, until the right
of publicity reaches at least its one hundredth anniversary.
405. Madow, supra note 49, at 239.
